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AXIOMATIC EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION
FOR GENERIC TWO-PLAYER GAMES
SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
Abstract. We impose three axioms on re¯nements of the Nash equilibria of games with
perfect recall that select connected closed nonempty subsets, called solutions.
Undominated Strategies: Each equilibrium in a solution uses undominated strategies.
Backward Induction: Each solution contains a quasi-perfect equilibrium.
Small Worlds: The solutions of a game are induced by the solutions of any larger game in
which it is embedded such that players' strategies and payo®s are preserved.
For games with two players and generic payo®s these axioms characterize each solution
as an essential component of equilibria in undominated strategies, and thus a stable set as
de¯ned by Mertens (1989).
1. Introduction
Nash's [26, 27] de¯nition of equilibrium is insu±cient in some respects; e.g. an equilibrium
can use weakly dominated strategies, or yield an outcome di®erent from the one predicted by
backward induction in a game with perfect information. The literature on re¯nements aims
to sharpen Nash's de¯nition to exclude such equilibria. Recent surveys include [10, 15, 36]
and we add comments in Section 6.
Kohlberg and Mertens [17] suggest that a re¯nement should be characterized by axioms
adapted from decision theory. They also specify properties that axioms should imply. Subse-
quently, Mertens [22, 23, 24, 25] de¯nes the set-valued re¯nement called stability and shows
that it has these and other properties, including the following.
1
1. Admissibility and Perfection. All equilibria in a stable set are perfect (hence admis-
sible) so each player's strategy in each equilibrium is undominated.
2. Backward Induction and Forward Induction. A stable set includes a proper equilib-
rium that induces a quasi-perfect (hence sequential) equilibrium in every extensive-
form game with perfect recall that has the same normal form. A subset of a stable
Key words and phrases. game, equilibrium, re¯nement, axiom, admissibility, backward induction, small
worlds, stability. JEL subject classi¯cation: C72. Date: 4 October 2010.
1In this paper our characterization in Theorem 5.2 su±ces as the de¯nition of a stable set. A simpli¯ed
rendition of Mertens' [22] de¯nition is that a connected closed set of equilibria is stable if it has the property
that the projection map, from a connected closed neighborhood in the graph of equilibria over the space of
players' strategies perturbed toward mixed strategies, has a point of coincidence with every continuous map
having the same domain and range. Govindan and Mertens [4] establish an equivalent de¯nition in terms of
players' best-reply correspondences. Mertens' general de¯nition invokes homology theory and is used here
only in Appendices C (Lemma C.11) and D.
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set survives iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies and strategies that
are inferior replies at every equilibrium in the set.
3. Invariance, Small Worlds, and Decomposition. The stable sets of a game are the
projections of the stable sets of any larger game in which it is embedded. The stable
sets of the product of two independent games are the products of their stable sets.
For games in extensive form with perfect recall, we adopt three axioms that are versions of
these properties. We assume that a re¯nement selects for each game a nonempty collection
of nonempty connected closed subsets of equilibria, called solutions.
2 Brie°y, the axioms are
the following:
A. Undominated Strategies: A solution uses only undominated strategies.
B. Backward Induction: A solution contains a quasi-perfect equilibrium.
C. Small Worlds: A solution is immune to embedding the game within larger games
that preserve players' strategies and payo®s.
In Axiom A we invoke only the implication of admissibility that no player uses a weakly
dominated strategy. These properties are equivalent in two-player games. Axiom B insists
on inclusion of a quasi-perfect equilibrium because it induces a sequential equilibrium for
which the continuation strategy from a player's information set is admissible. Axiom C
ensures that a re¯nement is not vulnerable to framing e®ects depending on how the game
is presented within wider contexts called metagames. A metagame can include additional
players and additional pure strategies, provided these additional features do not alter optimal
decisions in the original game.
For games with two players and generic payo®s, we prove that these three axioms charac-
terize re¯nements whose solutions are stable sets. Our characterization is cast in terms of the
`enabling form' of a game in which two pure strategies of a player are considered equivalent
if they exclude the same terminal nodes of the game tree | the enabling form is de¯ned in
subsection 4.3 and explained further in Appendix A. Our main theorem establishes that the
axioms imply that each solution is an essential component of admissible equilibria.
3 For the
enabling form of a game this is the de¯ning property of a stable set.
When payo®s are generic, all equilibria in a component yield the same probability dis-
tribution over outcomes [19, Theorem 2]. For economic modeling and econometric studies,
therefore, the axioms' chief implication is that a predicted outcome distribution should result
2Solutions are assumed to be sets because Kohlberg and Mertens [17, pp. 1015, 1019, 1029] show that
there need not exist a single equilibrium satisfying weaker properties than the axioms invoked here. The
technical requirement that a solution is connected excludes the trivial re¯nement that selects all equilibria. If
only a single (possibly unconnected) subset is selected then only the trivial re¯nement satis¯es the conditions
invoked by Norde, Potters, Reijnierse, and Vermeulen [28].
3A component is a maximal closed connected set, and it is essential if it has the property described in
footnote 1. For the usual normal form of the game, a solution can be a subset of admissible equilibria in a
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from an essential component of the game's admissible equilibria. The secondary implication
that a solution includes all equilibria in the component is germane only for predicting players'
behaviors after deviations from equilibrium play, but it addresses the issue of whether se-
quential rationality is a relevant decision-theoretic criterion after deviations (Reny [31]). We
show that each equilibrium in a solution is induced by a quasi-perfect equilibrium in a solu-
tion of some metagame; therefore, it is sequentially rational when viewed in this metagame.
See [9, x2.3] for an example.
Section 2 establishes notation for Section 3, which speci¯es the axioms and a precise
de¯nition of embedding a game in a larger game. Appendix B veri¯es that Nash equilibria
satisfy this de¯nition of embedding. Section 4 establishes further notation and then Section
5 states and proves the main theorem, Theorem 5.1, using a convenient characterization of
stability stated in Theorem 5.2 and proved in Appendix C. Appendix D constructs a function
used in the proof, and Appendix E elaborates the assumption that payo®s are generic. The
proof is constructive in that each equilibrium in a stable set is shown to be induced by
a quasi-perfect equilibrium in a solution of a particular metagame with perfect recall that
embeds the given game. Section 6 interprets this result and provides concluding remarks.
2. Notation
This section provides su±cient notation for statements of the axioms in Section 3. Section
4 introduces additional notation for the theorems in Section 5 and Appendix C.
A typical game in extensive form is denoted ¡. Its speci¯cation includes a set N of players,
a game tree with perfect recall for each player, and an assignment of players' payo®s at each
terminal node of the tree. Let Hn be player n's collection of information sets, and let An(h)
be his set of feasible actions at information set h 2 Hn. The speci¯cation of the tree can
include a completely mixed strategy of Nature.
A player's pure strategy chooses an action at each of his information sets. Denote n's
simplex of mixed strategies by §n and interpret its vertices as his set Sn of pure strategies.
The sets of pro¯les of players' pure and mixed strategies are S =
Q
n Sn and § =
Q
n §n. The
normal form of ¡ assigns to each pro¯le of players' pure strategies the pro¯le of their expected
payo®s; equivalently, it is the multilinear (i.e. linear in each variable) function G : § ! RN
that to each pro¯le of their mixed strategies assigns the pro¯le of their expected payo®s.
A player's behavioral strategy speci¯es a mixture over his actions at each of his information
sets. Let Bn be n's set of behavioral strategies, and B =
Q
n Bn the set of pro¯les of players'
behavioral strategies. Each mixed strategy ¾n induces a behavioral strategy bn. Because the
game has perfect recall, for each behavioral pro¯le there are pro¯les of mixed strategies that
induce it and yield the same distribution of outcomes (Kuhn [20]).
As de¯ned by Nash [26, 27], an equilibrium is a pro¯le of players' mixed strategies such
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BRn(¾) ´ argmax¾0
n2§n Gn(¾0
n;¾¡n) is player n's best-reply correspondence, then ¾ 2 §
is an equilibrium i® ¾n 2 BRn(¾) for every player n. The analogous de¯nition of equilibrium
in behavioral strategies is equivalent for games with perfect recall.
A re¯nement is a correspondence that assigns to each game a nonempty collection of
nonempty connected closed subsets of its equilibria. Each selected subset is called a solution.
According to the above de¯nitions, a mixed or behavioral strategy makes choices even
at information sets that its previous choices exclude from being reached. In Section 4 we
consider pure strategies to be equivalent if they make the same choices at information sets
they do not exclude. And, we further simplify mixed and behavioral strategies by considering
only their induced probability distributions on non-excluded terminal nodes. The de¯nitions
of an equilibrium and a re¯nement have equivalent statements in terms of these strategy
spaces. Each equilibrium in a reduced strategy space corresponds to a set of equilibria as
de¯ned above, and analogously for solutions selected by a re¯nement. The axioms in Section
3 are stated in terms of mixed strategies. Because Axiom C implies invariance to redundant
strategies, later we use of equivalence classes of strategies.
3. The Axioms
3.1. Undominated Strategies. The ¯rst axiom requires simply that no player uses a
weakly dominated strategy. Say that a pro¯le of players' strategies is undominated if each
player's strategy is undominated.
Axiom A (Undominated Strategies): Each equilibrium in a solution is undominated.
3.2. Backward Induction. We interpret sequential equilibrium as the generalization to
games with perfect recall of backward induction in games with perfect information, and
to be consistent with Axiom A we insist on conditionally admissible continuations from
information sets. Here we obtain these properties from quasi-perfect equilibrium.
The standard de¯nition of quasi-perfect equilibrium relies on consideration of perturbed
strategies, but an alternative de¯nition uses its representation as a lexicographic equilibrium
[1, 3]. In this decision-theoretic version, each player's behavior is described initially by
a ¯nite sequence of mixed strategies, interpreted as other players' alternative hypotheses
about his actions, ordered lexicographically, but at a subsequent information set that reveals
deviation from equilibrium play, hypotheses that fail to explain the deviation are discarded.
Considering only a two-player game for simplicity, quasi-perfection requires that a player's
continuation is lexicographically optimal against the remaining subsequence of the other
player. Thus, at each information set of a player he continues with the ¯rst strategy in his
sequence that reaches that information set, and this continuation must be lexicographically
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that enable the information set to be reached; viz., any alternative strategy that is superior in
reply to one such hypothesis is inferior in reply to some hypothesis earlier in the subsequence.
However, to preserve continuity with previous literature we rely here on the original de¯-
nition by Van Damme [35, p. 8] and then derive the relevant lexicographic representation in
subsection 5.10 when proving Theorem 5.1.
De¯nition 3.1 (Quasi-Perfect Equilibrium). A pro¯le b 2 B of behavioral strategies is a
quasi-perfect equilibrium if it is the limit of a sequence of pro¯les of completely mixed behav-
ioral strategies for which, for each player n, from each of his information sets, continuation
of his strategy bn is an optimal reply to every pro¯le in the sequence.
Equivalently, if BRn(¢jh) is n's best-reply correspondence in terms of behavioral strategies
that continue from his information set h 2 Hn, and bn(h) is the continuation of his behavioral
strategy bn from this information set, then the pro¯le b 2 B is quasi-perfect if
(8k) (8n 2 N;h 2 Hn) bn(h) 2 BRn(^ b
kjh)
for some sequence ^ bk 2 B n @B converging to b.
If the mixed-strategy pro¯le ¾ 2 § induces a behavioral pro¯le b 2 B that is a quasi-perfect
equilibrium then we say that ¾ too is quasi-perfect. Similarly, the justifying sequence ^ bk can
be represented by a sequence ^ ¾k in § n @§ for which ^ ¾k converges to a mixed strategy that
enables the same outcome distribution as ¾ does.
Van Damme shows that a quasi-perfect equilibrium induces a perfect equilibrium of the
normal form, and a sequential equilibrium of the extensive form. Moreover, by construction
a quasi-perfect equilibrium provides for each player an optimal continuation from each of his
information sets that is admissible [1]. If payo®s are generic then every sequential equilibrium
is extensive-form perfect [19, 2] and quasi-perfect [14, 29]. However, if payo®s are nongeneric
(as here in subsection 5.6) then quasi-perfection invokes a stronger form of sequential ratio-
nality than in Kreps and Wilson's [19, x4,5] de¯nition of sequential equilibrium. Sequential
equilibrium requires only that each player's continuation from an information set is opti-
mal given the belief that the other player continues according to the ¯rst strategy in the
subsequence enabling the information set to be reached, whereas quasi-perfection requires
lexicographic optimality against the entire subsequence.
The second axiom requires that some equilibrium in a solution is quasi-perfect.
Axiom B (Backward Induction): Each solution contains a quasi-perfect equilibrium.
If payo®s are generic then Axioms A and B imply that each solution lies in a component
of the undominated equilibria, each of which yields the same distribution over outcomes as
sequential equilibria in the solution.6 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
3.3. Small Worlds. The third axiom requires that a re¯nement is not a®ected by extra-
neous features of wider contexts in which a game is embedded, provided such contexts do
not alter players' feasible strategies and payo®s. An embedding allows the presence of addi-
tional players whose actions might provide the original players with additional pure strategies
equivalent to mixed strategies in the original game, and thus redundant. For simplicity, we
de¯ne an embedding using the normal form G : § ! RN of the extensive-form game ¡.
An embedding is described by a `larger' game ~ G : ~ § £ §o ! RN[o in which game G is
`embedded,' subject to certain restrictions speci¯ed below. The larger game ~ G has outsiders
in a set o, in addition to insiders who are the players in N, and there can be additional
moves by Nature. An insider n can have additional pure strategies in ~ §n that are not pure
strategies in Sn but are equivalent to mixed strategies in §n. The basic requirement is that
an embedding should preserve the game among insiders, conditional on actions by outsiders.
These restrictions have a technical formulation. There should exist a multilinear map
f : ~ § £ §o ! § that is surjective and such that ~ Gn = Gn ± f for each insider n. Moreover,
to exclude an embedding from introducing correlation among insiders' strategies, f should
factor into separate multilinear maps (fn)n2N, where each component is a map fn : ~ §n£§o !
§n such that fn(¢;¾o) maps ~ §n surjectively onto §n for each pro¯le ¾o 2 §o of outsiders'
strategies.
A statement of the axiom that uses this technical language could contain unsuspected im-
plications, so after stating the formal de¯nition we provide in Proposition 3.3 an equivalent
formulation that is more detailed and more transparent, and that veri¯es the requisite prop-
erties. Also, Proposition 3.4 applies a precise test of whether the axiom is correctly stated,
namely, a re¯nement that satis¯es the axiom should be immune to the same embeddings
that equilibria are.
De¯nition 3.2 (Embedding). A game ~ G : ~ § £ §o ! RN[o and maps f = (fn)n2N, where
each map fn : ~ §n £ §o ! §n is multilinear, embed a game G : § ! RN if
(a) for each ¾o 2 §o and n 2 N, fn(¢;¾o) maps ~ §n surjectively onto §n, and
(b) ~ G = G ± f.
Condition (a) ensures that embedding has no net e®ect on an insider's set of mixed strategies,
conditional on outsiders' strategies, and condition (b) ensures that there is no net e®ect on
insiders' payo®s.
Hereafter, if ~ G embeds G via maps f = (fn) then we say that ( ~ G;f) embeds G and that ~ G
is a metagame for G. We omit description of f for metagames in extensive form that embed
a game in extensive or strategic form. An elaborate example of a metagame in extensive
form that embeds a game in extensive form is constructed in proving Theorem 5.1.
A multilinear map fn : ~ §n £ §o ! §n is completely speci¯ed by its values at pro¯les of
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of player n and the outsiders in o, and let ^ f = ( ^ fn)n2N. The following proposition, proved
in Appendix B, provides an alternative de¯nition of embedding in terms of pure strategies.
Proposition 3.3. ( ~ G;f) embeds G if and only if for each player n there exists ~ Tn µ ~ Sn and
a bijection ¼n : ~ Tn ! Sn such that for each (~ s;so) 2 ~ S £ So and ~ tn 2 ~ Tn:
(1) ^ fn(~ tn;so) = ¼n(~ tn), and
(2) ~ Gn(~ s;so) = Gn( ^ f(~ s;so)).
Property (2) assures that players' payo®s from pure strategies of G are preserved by the
metagame ~ G. Hence property (1) assures that each pure strategy sn 2 Sn is equivalent to
some pure strategy ~ tn = ¼¡1(sn) 2 ~ Tn independently of the outsiders' pro¯le so.
Pure strategies in ~ Sn n ~ Tn are redundant because payo®s from pro¯les in
Q
n ~ Tn exactly
replicate payo®s from corresponding pro¯les in
Q
n Sn for the embedded game G. In par-
ticular, if ^ fn(~ sn;so) = ¾n = 2 Sn then conditional on so the pure strategy ~ sn is equivalent for
insiders to the mixed strategy ¾n 2 §n.
The next Proposition, proved in Appendix B, veri¯es that equilibria are not a®ected by
embedding in a metagame.
Proposition 3.4. If ( ~ G;f) embeds G then the equilibria of G are the f-images of the
equilibria of ~ G.
A corollary of Proposition 3.4 is that embedding does not introduce correlation among
insiders' strategies.
Using De¯nition 3.2 of embedding, the small worlds axiom is the following.
Axiom C (Small Worlds): If ( ~ G;f) embeds G then the f-images of the solutions that a
re¯nement selects for ~ G are the solutions selected for G.
In view of Proposition 3.4, this axiom is an instance of the general principle that a re¯nement
should inherit invariance properties of equilibria. Two special cases of Axiom C are the
following.
Invariance: Suppose §o and o are singletons and insiders' payo®s and strategies in ~ § di®er
from § only by treating some mixed strategies in § as additional pure strategies in ~ S. Then
Axiom C implies that solutions depend only on a game's reduced normal form obtained by
deleting such redundant pure strategies.
Mertens' Small Worlds Axiom [24]: Suppose ~ § = §. Then Axiom C implies that a
solution does not depend on the presence of outsiders, i.e. solutions of the original game are
the projections of the solutions of metagames obtained by adding players that are dummies
with respect to the game G.8 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
3.4. Summary of the Axioms. We study re¯nements that are independent of embeddings
in metagames that, for each pro¯le of outsiders' strategies, preserve the strategies and payo®s
of the game among insiders. And, we require that each of their solutions is a closed connected
set of undominated equilibria, including one that is quasi-perfect. In particular, a solution
of a metagame must contain a quasi-perfect equilibrium whose image is in the corresponding
solution of the embedded game.
4. Additional Notation and Properties
In the sequel we consider only a game ¡ in extensive form with perfect recall, two players,
and generic payo®s. In this section we prepare for the statement and proof of the main
theorem in Section 5.
4.1. Payo®s. Let Z be the set of terminal nodes of the game tree. Players' payo®s are given
by a point u in U = RN£Z, where un(z) is the payo® to player n 2 N at terminal node z 2 Z.
We assume that payo®s are generic in that there exists a lower dimensional subset U± of U
such that our results are true for all games in U n U±. The set U± includes the nongeneric
set described in [5]. Therefore, each game outside U± has ¯nitely many equilibrium outcome
distributions, and in particular all equilibria in a component yield the same distribution
over outcomes. However, the proofs in Section 5 and Appendix C require some genericity
properties that are not necessarily implied by the construction in [5]. To avoid disrupting
the main exposition, we defer to Appendix E the description of the exact set of genericity
properties required for the proofs, and an explanation of why the resulting set U± of excluded
payo®s has lower dimension.
4.2. Notation for the Extensive Form. The set of players is N = f1;2g, typically rep-
resented as a player n and the other player m 6= n. Let X be the set of nodes in the game
tree. Let Xn be the set of nodes where player n moves, partitioned into his information
sets h 2 Hn. For a node x 2 Xn we write h(x) for the unique information set h 2 Hn that
contains x. For each n and h 2 Hn, let An(h) be the set of actions available to player n at
h. Assume that actions at all information sets are labeled di®erently, and let An be the set
of all actions for player n.
Node x precedes another node y, written x Á y, if x is on the unique path from the root
of the tree to y. For a node x 2 Xn and a 2 An(h(x)) write (x;a) Á y if x Á y and the path
from the root of the tree to y requires player n to choose a at h(x). If (x;a) Á y and x and
y belong to n's information sets h and h0, respectively, then every node in h0 follows some
node in h by the choice of a, so we write (h;a) Á h0.
The set of pure strategies of player n is the set Sn of functions sn : Hn ! An such that
sn(h) 2 An(h) for all h 2 Hn. For each n, sn 2 Sn and y 2 X, let ¯n(y;sn) be the probability
that sn does not exclude y, i.e. ¯n(y;sn) = 1 if for each (x;a) Á y with x 2 Xn, sn(h(x)) = a,AXIOMATIC EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION 9
and otherwise ¯n(y;sn) = 0. By perfect recall, if y 2 Xn then ¯n(y0;sn) = ¯n(y;sn) for all
y0 2 h(y) and we write ¯n(h(y);sn) for this probability. Likewise, for any node y we write
¯0(y) for the probability that Nature does not exclude y. Then for a pro¯le s 2 S the
probability that node y is reached is ¯(y;s) ´ ¯0(y)¯1(y;s1)¯2(y;s2).
Recall that §n is the set of mixed strategies of player n. For each node y the function
¯n(y;¢) extends to a function over §n via ¯n(y;¾n) =
P
sn2Sn ¯n(y;sn)¾n(sn) for ¾n 2 §n.
Recall also that Bn is the set of behavioral strategies of player n. For each bn 2 Bn, ¯n(y;bn)
is the product of bn's probabilities of n's actions on the path to y.
Similarly extend ¯ to pro¯les of mixed or behavioral strategies. Given a mixed-strategy
pro¯le ¾ 2 §, the probability that outcome z results is ¯(z;¾) = ¯0(z)¯1(z;¾1)¯2(z;¾2).
4.3. Enabling Strategies. For each player n de¯ne ½n : §n ! [0;1]Z by the formula
½n(¾n) = (¯n(z;¾n))z2Z, and let ½ = (½n)n2N. Similarly, if bn 2 Bn is the behavioral strategy
induced by ¾n then ½n(¾n) = (¯n(z;bn))z2Z. Let Pn be the image of ½n, and P =
Q
n Pn
the image of ½. Then Pn is a compact convex polyhedron, called the space of n's enabling
strategies in [6]. Each vertex of Pn corresponds to an equivalence class of n's pure strategies
that exclude the same outcomes. The vertices of Pn are n's pure strategies in the `pure
reduced normal form' de¯ned by Mailath, Samuelson, and Swinkels [21]; see Appendix A for
illustrations.
If ¾ 2 § and p = ½(¾) then the probability of outcome z is °z(p) = ¯0(z)p1(z)p2(z). Thus
the function ° : P ! ¢(Z) summarizes the extensive form. The analog of the game ¡'s
normal form G : § ! RN is the enabling form G : P ! RN that assigns to each pro¯le
of enabling strategies the pro¯le of players' expected payo®s, where Gn(p) =
P
z °z(p)un(z).
Note that ° and G are multilinear functions. From players' best-reply correspondences in
terms of enabling strategies one obtains the de¯nition of equilibrium in enabling strategies.
To each equilibrium in enabling strategies there correspond families of outcome-equivalent
equilibria in behavioral and mixed strategies. The axioms have direct analogs in terms of
enabling strategies, as shown in [12].
For games in extensive form with perfect recall, enabling strategies are minimal repre-
sentations. For example, using perfect recall, by working backward in the induced tree of
a player's information sets, from his enabling strategy one can construct the correspond-
ing behavioral strategy at his information sets that his prior actions do not exclude [6, x5].
Because Axiom C implies Invariance, it is immaterial whether solutions are characterized
in terms of mixed or enabling strategies. We use enabling strategies here because induced
distributions over outcomes are multilinear functions of enabling strategies, like they are for
mixed strategies but unlike the nonlinear dependence on behavioral strategies. Also, the10 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
dimensions of the spaces of enabling and behavioral strategies are the same, which is im-
portant for the technical property established in Theorem 5.2 below. Using these features,
Section 5 derives the implications of the axioms in terms of enabling strategies.
5. Statement and Proof of the Theorem
We now state and prove the main theorem. As in Section 4 we consider a game ¡ in
extensive form with perfect recall, two players, and generic payo®s. We assume that a
solution is represented in terms of enabling strategies, i.e. Q¤ ½ P is a solution i® it is the
image under ½ of a solution §¤ ½ §. We say that Q¤ is stable if §¤ is stable.4
Theorem 5.1. If a re¯nement satis¯es Axioms A, B, and C then each solution is stable.
The proof occupies the remainder of this section.
5.1. Stable Sets of Equilibria. The proof begins by characterizing stable sets for games
in the class considered here. This characterization in Theorem 5.2 is somewhat simpler than
the general de¯nition in Mertens [22] and for readers unfamiliar with homology theory it can
be taken as the de¯nition.
Let ¹ §¤ be a component of the equilibria of ¡ in terms of mixed strategies, and let ¹ §¤
n be
the projection of ¹ §¤ in §n. Also let §¤ be a component of the undominated equilibria of the
game ¡ that is contained in ¹ §¤. Let Q¤ be the image of §¤ under ½ and for each n let Q¤
n
be the image of §¤
n under ½n, i.e. represented in enabling strategies.
By genericity, all equilibria in ¹ §¤ induce the same distribution over outcomes. Therefore,
for each node x, ¯(x;¾) is the same for all ¾ 2 ¹ §¤; in particular, if x belongs to information
set h 2 Hn and h is on an equilibrium path then ¯n(h;¾n) is the same for every equilibrium




n be the collection of information sets h 2 Hn of player n such that ¯¤
n(h) > 0 and let
A¤
n be the set of actions at information sets in H¤
n that are chosen with positive probability
by the equilibria in ¹ B¤, where ¹ B¤ is the set of pro¯les of behavioral strategies induced by
equilibria in ¹ §¤.
Let S0
n ½ Sn be the set of pure strategies s0
n with the property that, at each information
set h 2 H¤
n that s0
n does not exclude, s0
n prescribes an action in A¤
n. Let S1
n = Sn n S0
n, i.e.
each pure strategy sn in S1
n chooses a non-equilibrium action at some information set h 2 H¤
n
that it does not exclude.
For i = 0;1, let §i
n be the set of mixed strategies whose support is contained in Si
n. Observe
that the support of n's strategy in every equilibrium in ¹ §¤ is contained in S0
n and that every
4Alternatively, one can apply the de¯nition of stability directly to Q¤ as a component of equilibria,
represented in terms of enabling strategies, in the graph over the space of perturbations of players' enabling
strategies as in footnote 1. As noted by Mertens [24, 25], more generally one can apply analogs of stability
and Axioms A, B, and C to games in strategic form for which each player's strategy set is a convex polyhedron
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strategy in S0
n is a best reply against every equilibrium in ¹ §¤. Thus ¹ §¤
n is contained in §0
n
and ¹ §¤ = ¹ §¤
1 £ ¹ §¤
2. Hence §¤ = §¤
1 £ §¤
2 where §¤
n is a component of the intersection of ¹ §¤
n
with the set of undominated strategies.
If S1
n is empty for each n then each equilibrium in ¹ B¤ is completely mixed; by genericity,
¹ B¤ is a singleton and its equivalent mixed strategy is stable. Thus if a solution concept
satisfying our axioms selects this equilibrium, it is automatically stable. The only interesting
case, therefore, is one where S1
n is nonempty for at least one of the players. In order to avoid
dealing with di®erent cases, we assume that S1
n is nonempty for each n. Along the way we
indicate how the proof changes when S1
n is empty for exactly one player.
Let P 0
n be n's set of enabling strategies in the image of §0
n under ½n. Let Z1
n ½ Z be the
set of terminal nodes z such that (h;a) Á z for some h 2 H¤
n and a = 2 A¤
n. Let Z0
n = Zn nZ1
n.
Then P 0
n is the set of pn 2 Pn such that pn(z) = 0 for all z 2 Z1
n and thus P 0
n is a face
of Pn. However, the image P 1
n of §1
n under ½n need not be a face of Pn. For i = 0;1, let
P i = P i
1 £ P i
2 and de¯ne P = P 0 £ P 1.
For each enabling strategy pn 2 Pn, let ªZ1





n(pn) = 0 i® pn 2 P 0




n p0(z)¹ pm(z)pn(z), where p0 is Nature's enabling strategy. Then ´(pn) = 0 i®
pn 2 P 0
n. Choose " > 0 such that ´n(pn) > " for all pn 2 P 1
n. Let Hn be the hyperplane
in RZ1
n with normal (p0(z)¹ pm(z))z2Z1




n be the intersection of Hn with ªZ1
n(Pn). Let ¹ ¼1
n be the function from
Pn n P 0
n to ¦1
n that maps each pn = 2 P 0
n to the point "(´n(pn))
¡1ªZ1
n(pn).
In the following we invoke lexicographically optimal replies as de¯ned in Blume, Bran-
denburger, and Dekel [1] and Govindan and Klumpp [3]. Recall that n's strategy ¾n is
lexicographically optimal against a sequence (¾k
m)k=1;2;:: of m's strategies if any alternative
strategy ^ ¾n that is a better reply to ¾k
m for some k is a worse reply to ¾j
m for some j < k.
Given Q¤, let Q be the set of those (q¤;(p0;p1);¼1) 2 Q¤ £ P £ ¦1 such that there exist
r0; ~ p0
n 2 P 0
n, r1 2 P 1
n, and for each n scalars ¸0
n;¸1
n;¹1









































n < 1 then r1
n is an optimal reply against q¤




m) as other strategies in P 1
n.
In case S1
n is empty (and S1
m is not) then the set ¦1
n is empty so we set P = P 0 £ P 1
m and
points in Q then have the form (q¤;(p0;p1
m);¼1
m), and we drop the optimality requirement
(iii) for n.12 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
The set Q is the graph of lexicographically optimal replies to possible deviations from
equilibria in Q¤. The formulation appears complicated only because of the need to consider
for each player n both strategies p0
n and p1
n that do and do not adhere to equilibrium play,
and also possible mixtures of these with others having the same properties, so that altered
probabilities of actions are included. For each equilibrium q¤ one considers for each player n a
pair (p0
n;p1
n) of enabling strategies such that p0
n conforms to the equilibrium and p1
n deviates.
Further, one considers a mixture q0
n of p0
n and some other conforming strategy r0
n, and also
a mixture q1
n of some conforming strategy ~ p0
n and a mixture of the nonconforming strategy
p1
n and some other nonconforming strategy r1
n, where condition (i) requires that q1
n yields
the speci¯ed probabilities ¼1 on those terminal nodes excluded by equilibrium behavior.
From these strategies one obtains the sequence (q¤
n;q0
n;q1
n) of alternative hypotheses about
n's strategies, ordered lexicographically. For the case that the mixtures give positive weight
to the alternative conforming strategy r0
n and nonconforming strategy r1
n, one requires in
(ii) that r0
n is lexicographically optimal against the other's sequence, and in (iii) that r1
n is
an optimal reply to the equilibrium q¤ and lexicographically optimal among nonconforming
strategies. The point (q¤;(p0;p1);¼1) is then in the graph above the point (p0;p1) describing




n is lexicographically optimal against the other's sequence.
Let ª : Q ! P be the natural projection, i.e. ª(q¤;(p0;p1);¼1) = (p0;p1). Let @Q =
ª¡1(@P). The projection map ª is essential if every continuous map Á : Q ! P has a point
of coincidence with ª, i.e. Á(x) = ª(x) for some x 2 Q. The following characterization of a
stable set is proved in Appendix C.
Theorem 5.2. (Q;@Q) is a pseudomanifold of the same dimension as (P;@P). Moreover,
Q¤ is stable if and only if the projection map ª : (Q;@Q) ! (P;@P) is essential.
In spite of the desirable properties 1, 2, 3 listed in Section 1, the de¯nition of stability
via the essentiality of the projection map has been a major impediment to justifying it
as an economically relevant re¯nement. For instance, it implies more than the intuitively
plausible requirement that the projection map should be surjective so that there exist nearby
equilibria of nearby games obtained by perturbing players' strategy sets. However, the proof
that follows shows that for the class of games considered here its implications are precisely
the same as the conjunction of the decision-theoretic Axioms A, B, and C, each of which has
concrete economic signi¯cance.
5.2. Plan of the Proof. First we outline the method for proving Theorem 5.1. That a
stable set satis¯es the axioms is shown by Mertens [22]. Here show that the axioms imply
that a solution is stable.
Let ^ § ½ § be a solution of the game ¡ and let ^ Q ´ ½(^ §) be the set of enabling strategies
equivalent to ^ §. By Axiom A, ^ § is a connected set of equilibria in undominated strategies.AXIOMATIC EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION 13
Hence it belongs to a component §¤ of equilibria in undominated strategies and thus ^ Q is
contained in Q¤ ´ ½(§¤). We will show that ^ Q equals Q¤ and is stable. We accomplish
this as follows. We take an arbitrary point q0;¤ 2 Q¤ and an arbitrary neighborhood U(q0;¤)
of q0;¤. Then we construct a corresponding sequence of metagames ~ ¡± as a parameter ±
converges to zero. Using Axioms B and C, for each metagame ~ ¡± in the sequence, there
exists a quasi-perfect equilibrium whose projection, call it q0;±, to P is contained in ^ Q. Take
any such sequence of q0;± converging to some point q0;0 in ^ Q. We will show that: (i) the
limit point q0;0 belongs U(q0;¤), hence ^ Q = Q¤; and (ii) the existence of such a sequence
converging to a limit point in U(q0;¤) implies that the projection map ª is essential, hence
Q¤ is stable.
5.3. Preliminaries. In this subsection we lay the groundwork for the metagames to be
constructed in the proof.
For the given set Q¤ containing the solution ^ Q, let (Q;@Q) be the associated pseudomani-
fold, as constructed in subsection 5.1. Let q0;¤ be an arbitrary point in Q¤ and let U(q0;¤) be
a neighborhood of q0;¤. For each player m, choose a point p0;¤
m in the interior of P 0
m against
which q0;¤ is a best reply and strategies in P 1
n are inferior replies. Such a choice is possible
by genericity of payo®s: the interior of the projection of ¹ §¤
m, which is the component of m's
equilibrium strategies that contains §¤
m, belongs to the interior of P 0
m and all strategies in
P 1
n are inferior replies against every such point. Since q0;¤
n belongs to Q¤
n, which consists only
of undominated (hence admissible) strategies, there exists a point pm in the interior of Pm
against which q0;¤
n is a best reply. pm is equivalent to a completely mixed strategy ¾m in §m.
Also, by the genericity of payo®s, we can choose pm to be such that strategies in P 0
n that do
not belong to the face containing q0;¤
n in its interior are strictly inferior replies against pm.
Express ¾m as a convex combination of ¾0
m and ¾1
m, where for i = 0;1, ¾i









m are in the relative interiors of P 0
m and P 1
m respectively, and
pm is a convex combination of p0
m and p1;¤
m . It follows that x¤ ´ (q0;¤;(p0;¤;p1;¤);¼1;¤) belongs
to Q n @Q, where for each n, ¼1;¤
n = ¹ ¼1
n(p1;¤
n ), and in the de¯nition of Q, q0
n is p0;¤
n , and q1
n is
pn, which is a convex combination of p0
n and p1;¤
n .
It follows from our construction in Appendix C that x¤ belongs to the interior of a poly-
hedron of the same dimension as P. Therefore, we can choose a neighborhood V (x¤) of x¤
that is homeomorphic to a simplex, is contained in Q n @Q, and is such that the projection
onto the ¯rst factor is contained in the neighborhood U(q0;¤), i.e. if (q0;(p0;p1);¼1) 2 V (x¤)
then q0 2 U(q0;¤).
In Appendix D we construct a continuous map g : Q ! P and a constant ® > 0 such
that kg(x) ¡ ª(x)k 6 ® for some x 2 Q only if ª is essential and x 2 V (x¤). Now extend
the map g to the whole of P 0 £ P £ ¦ in an arbitrary fashion, calling it still g. Also, we14 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
will now view ª as the projection from P 0 £ P £ ¦ to P. Choose a triangulation Ki
n of
P i
n for each n and i = 0;1 such that the diameter of each simplex is no more than ®=2.
For each n there exists for each i a triangulation Li
n of P i
n and a triangulation L¦
n of ¦1
n
such that, letting L be the resulting multisimplicial subdivision of P 0 £ P £ ¦1, g has a




n. Observe that if for some x = (q0;(p0;p1);¼1) there exists a multisimplex K
that contains ª(x) and ~ g(x), then kg(x)¡ª(x)k 6 ®: this follows from the fact that, since ~ g
is a multisimplicial approximation of g, ~ g(x) belongs to the multisimplex that contains g(x)
in its interior. An important implication of this observation is that if, in particular, this x
also belongs to Q, then ª is essential, x 2 V (x¤), and q0 2 U(q0;¤). Thus, that such a point
belongs to Q will be the ¯nal step of the proof in subsection 5.12.
As in [8, Appendix B], now take a further polyhedral subdivision T of L and let ° be
the convex function generated by T , i.e. ° is piecewise linear and linear precisely on each
full-dimensional polyhedron of the subdivision.
5.4. A Game with Redundant Strategies. In this subsection we construct from ¡ a
larger game by adding redundant pure strategies that will be the basis for the metagame
speci¯ed in subsection 5.5. Because Axiom C implies Invariance, the solutions of ¡ are
equivalent to the solutions of this larger game.
For each ¯xed ^ p = (p0;p1) 2 P and ± 2 (0;1), consider the following game ¡(±; ^ p). Each
player n chooses a strategy in the following manner (and unaware of his opponent's choices).
Initially, player n provisionally chooses a pure strategy s0
n 2 S0
n, or he rejects all strategies
in S0
n.
² If initially he chooses a strategy s0
n then at a subsequent second stage he can retain
s0
n or revise his choice. If he chooses to revise his choice, then at a third stage the
revisions available are `duplicate' pure strategies in the set T 0
n(±;p0
n) consisting of all
mixed strategies of the form tn(±;p0
n) ´ (1 ¡ ±)tn + ±p0
n for some tn 2 S0
n.
² If he rejects all strategies in S0
n at the ¯rst stage, then at a second stage he can
choose among the strategies in T 0
n(±;p0
n) or reject them all.5 If he rejects them all
then at a third stage he chooses among the pure strategies in S1
n [ T 1
n(±;p1
n), where
each strategy in T 1
n(±;p1
n) is a duplicate of the form tn(±;p1
n) ´ (1 ¡ ±)tn + ±p1
n for
some tn 2 S0
n.
In ¡(±; ^ p) the set of n's pure strategies is ~ Sn(±; ^ pn) ´ Sn [ T 0
n(±;p0
n) [ T 1
n(±;p1
n). Thus, game
¡(±; ^ p) has the same reduced normal form as ¡.
5It would have su±ced, at this stage, to give player n the option of playing just the strategy p0
n instead
of all the strategies in T0
n(±;p0
n), which we do only for economy in notation.AXIOMATIC EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION 15
5.5. Extensive Form of the Metagames. Now we specify a family of similar metagames
~ ¡±, one for each ± 2 (0;1).
Before the insiders play, thirteen outsiders, denoted players o0 and oi
n;j for n = 1;2, i = 0;1
and j = 1;2;3, move simultaneously. Outsider o0 chooses a full-dimensional polyhedron T
of the polyhedral complex T . Outsider oi
n;j, for n = 1;2, j = 1;3 and i = 0;1, chooses a
point in the vertex set W i
n of Ki
n. Outsider o0
n;2 chooses a point in a ¯nite subset S0;±
n of P 0
n
chosen such that every point in P 0
n is within ± of some point in S0;±
n ; outsider o1
n;2 chooses a
point in a ¯nite subset S1;±
n of ¦1
n such that every point in ¦1




n;1, each pure strategy vi




Therefore, each mixed strategy ¾i




obtained by taking the appropriate average of the points induced by the pure strategies in
the support of ¾i
n;1. Likewise a mixed strategy ¾0
n;2 of o0




n, and a mixed strategy ¾1
n;2 of o1




A mixed-strategy pro¯le ~ ¾o for the outsiders induces a point (q0(~ ¾o);(p0(~ ¾o);p1(~ ¾o));¼1(~ ¾o))
in P 0£P£¦1, where for each n and i, pi




n(~ ¾o) depend on the choices by o0
n;2 and o1
n;2 respectively.
After each pure-strategy pro¯le ~ so of the outsiders there follows a copy of the game
¡(±; ^ p(~ so)). That is, if in the pro¯le ~ so outsiders oi
n;1 choose points vi
n, then there follows





information sets in ~ ¡± are such that the insiders play without knowing which copy of ¡(±; ^ p)
they are playing. The sets of duplicate strategies available are therefore now denoted by
T 0
n(±) and T 1
n(±), omitting the reference to p0
n and p1
n, since the insiders are uninformed
about which mixtures were implemented by outsiders. Put di®erently, for i = 0;1 and
tn 2 S0
n, the exact duplicate strategy implemented by choosing ti
n(±) 2 T i
n(±) depends on the
choice by outsider oi
n;1 which insiders do not observe. Thus in the metagame ~ ¡±, player n's
set of pure strategies, up to duplication of pure strategies, is ~ Sn(±) ´ Sn [ T 0
n(±) [ T 1
n(±).
That the metagame ~ ¡± embeds ¡ follows from Proposition 3.3. The strategies in Sn are
available as pure strategies in ~ Sn(±) and the other pure strategies, which belong to T i
n(±),
for i = 0;1, implement mixtures in §n that depend on the choices of outsiders oi
n;1.
5.6. Outsiders' Payo®s in the Metagames. Next we describe the outsiders' payo®s in
each metagame ~ ¡±.
The payo®s to o0 depend on the choices of all outsiders except outsiders oi
n;3 for i = 0;1 and
n = 1;2. Recall that the convex function ° is linear over each full-dimensional polyhedron T
of T . This linear function extends uniquely to a linear function °T over P 0 £P£¦1. Every16 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
mixed strategy pro¯le of the other outsiders induces a unique point (~ q; ^ p;¼1) 2 P 0 £P£¦1
and o0's payo® from choosing T is °T(~ q; ^ p;¼1).
Outsider oi
n;1 wants to mimic oi




his payo® is one if vi
n = wi
n and zero otherwise.
Outsider o0
n;2 wants to mimic the actual choice implemented by player n when this choice
belongs to P 0
n. Similarly, outsider o1
n;2 wants to mimic the ¼1
n implied by n's choice when he
plays a strategy in P 1
n. Speci¯cally, for i = 0;1, let 'i
n : RZi






z. For each r 2 RZi
n, let »i
n(r;¢) be the a±ne approximation to 'i
n at r, i.e.






z ¡ rz)). Suppose now that oi
n;2 chooses a pure
strategy s
i;±
n;2 and n chooses a pure strategy ~ sn in ~ Sn(±). If ~ sn is in T 0
n(±) or T 1
n(±) then let qn




n) where for each
i, vi
n is the choice of outsider oi
n;1; and otherwise let qn = ~ sn. For outsider o0
n;2, his payo® is
zero if qn = 2 P 0
n; otherwise, it is »0
n(s
0;±
n;2;qn). For outsider o1
n;2, his payo® is zero if qn 2 P 0
n;





The payo® to outsider oi
n;3 depends on the choices of all other outsiders. If o0 chooses
a polyhedron T then there exists a unique multisimplex L of L that contains T. For each
vertex wi
n of W i
n, and each vertex ~ v of L, let ui
n;2(T; ~ v;wi
n) = 1 if wi
n is the image of ~ v under ~ gi
n
and zero otherwise, where ~ gi
n is the (n;i)-th coordinate map of ~ g. The function ui
n;2 extends
multilinearly to L and, since L is full-dimensional, to the whole of P 0 £ P £ ¦1, denoted
still by ui
n;2(T;¢;wi
n). Given an arbitrary mixed strategy of the other players, if o0 chooses
T and oi
n;2 chooses wi
n then the payo® of oi
n;2 is ui
n;2(T;(p;q);wi
n), where (p;q) is the point
in P 0 £ P £ ¦1 induced by the mixed strategies of the other players.
5.7. Outsiders' Strategies in a Quasi-Perfect Equilibrium. In this subsection we de-
rive the relevant features of outsiders' strategies in a quasi-perfect equilibrium.
By Axioms B and C, in the metagame ~ ¡± there exists a quasi-perfect equilibrium ~ b± whose
equivalent mixed-strategy pro¯le ~ ¾± belongs to a solution and whose image under the map
from the metagame ~ ¡± to ¡ is a point in the solution ^ Q for the original game ¡.
Each player n's strategy in ~ b± necessarily has the following feature. He avoids going to his
information set where his choices are among the strategies in S1
n(±) [ T 1
n(±), since each of
these strategies chooses a non-equilibrium action at some information set on the equilibrium
path. Let q0;±
n be n's actual strategy in P 0
n that is implemented by n's strategy in the pro¯le
~ b± in the metagame ~ ¡±. By construction, q0;±
n belongs to ^ Q.
Let ~ x± ´ (~ q0;±;(p0;±;p1;±); ~ ¼1;±) be the point in P 0 £ P £ ¦1 that is induced by the pro¯le
~ ¾±
o of the outsiders' strategies in the equilibrium ~ ¾±.
Under ~ b±, after n has rejected all strategies in S0
n and T 0
n(±), consider the strategy imple-
mented by n. Let (1 ¡ ®1;±
n ) be the total probability of choosing a duplicate in T 1
n(±) underAXIOMATIC EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION 17




n ´ (1 ¡ ®
1;±









where: (i) · p0
n(±) is the mixture over strategies tn such that the strategy t1
n(±) is played
with positive probability at this information set; (ii) p1;±
n = p1
n(~ ¾1
n;1) is the enabling strategy
induced by the equilibrium strategy ~ ¾1
n;1 of outsider o1
n;1; (iii) r1;±
n is the enabling strategy in
P 1
n that is obtained from n's actual mixture over strategies in S1
n if ®1;±
n > 0, and is arbitrary
otherwise. Let
q
1;± = (±(1 ¡ ®
1;±















n) = ¹ ¼1
n(q1;±
n ) ´ ¼1;±
n .
The following lemma characterizes the important aspects of the outsiders' equilibrium
strategies.
Lemma 5.3. The equilibrium strategies of the outsiders satisfy the following properties.
(1) For each n, suppose the vertices in the support W i;±
n of oi
n;3's equilibrium strategy
span a simplex Ki;±
n of Ki
n. Then pi;±
n belongs to Ki;±
n .
(2) If every polyhedron in the support of o0's strategy contains ~ x± then, for each n and
i, the vertices in W i;±
n span a simplex Ki;±
n , and ~ gn;i(~ x±) belongs to the interior of a
simplex ¹ Ki;±
n that has Ki;±
n as a face.
(3) Every polyhedron in the support of o0's strategy contains ~ x±.
(4) ~ q0;±
n is within ± of q0;±
n and ~ ¼1;±
n is within ± of ¼1;±
n .
Proof of Lemma. Outsider oi
n;1 wants to mimic outsider oi
n;3. So, if the vertices of W i;±
n span
a simplex Ki;±
n then the payo® to oi
n;1 from choosing a vertex wi
n is positive if it belongs to
W i;±;
n and zero otherwise. Point (1) follows.
Let ¹ L = ~ L0 £ (L0 £ L1) £ L¦ be the unique multisimplex of L that contains ~ x± in its
interior. For each polyhedron T in the support of o0's strategy, there exists a full-dimensional
multisimplex ^ L of L that contains T. Obviously ^ L has ¹ L as a face. oi
n;3's payo® from choosing
a strategy wi
n if o0 chooses such a T, and given the strategies of the other outsiders, is positive
if it is the image of a vertex of ¹ L under ~ gi
n and zero otherwise. Since the image of the vertices
of ¹ L under the coordinate function ~ gi
n span a simplex ¹ Ki;±
n , ~ gi
n(~ x±) 2 ¹ Ki;±
n and the vertices of
W i;±
n span a face of ¹ Ki;±
n . Therefore, point (2) follows.
For each polyhedron T of T , o0's payo® from T is °T(~ x±) and by construction, °T(~ x±) 6
°(~ x±) with the inequality being strict i® ~ x± does not belong to T, which proves (3).
It remains to prove (4). The actual strategy implemented by n is q0;±
n , which belongs to
P 0
n. o0
n;2's payo® function is such that his best replies to q0;±
n are the points in S0;±
n that are
closest to q0;±
n . Thus ~ q0;±
n is within ± of q0;±
n . Since q0;±
n belongs to P 0
n, all of o1
n;2's strategies18 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
yield a payo® of zero against q0;±
n . However, since the behavioral strategy ~ b± is a quasi-perfect
equilibrium, there exists a sequence of completely mixed behavioral strategies ~ b";± converging
to ~ b± against which o1
n;2's equilibrium strategy ~ ¾±
n;2 is a best reply. Under the sequence ~ b";±,
there is a positive probability that player n rejects the strategies in S0
n [ T 0
n(±) and makes
a choice among strategies in S1
n [ T 1
n(±). The fact that ~ ¾±
n;2 is optimal against the sequence
implies that it is optimal against the limiting choice · q±





replies are within ± of ¼1;±
n and thus ~ ¼1;±
n is within ± of ¼1;±
n as well. ¤
5.8. Limits of the Quasi-Perfect Equilibria of the Metagames. In this subsection we
derive the limits of the metagames' quasi-perfect equilibria as ± # 0.
Consider a sequence of ±'s converging to zero and a corresponding sequence ~ b± of quasi-
perfect equilibria in solutions of the metagames ~ ¡±. Let ~ ¾± be an equivalent sequence of
mixed strategies and let (~ q0;±;(p0;±;p1;±); ~ ¼1;±) be the sequence in P 0£P£¦1 induced by the
outsiders' strategies.
Let ~ q0;0, (p0;0;p1;0), and ~ ¼1;0 be the corresponding limits of ~ q0;±, (p0;±;p1;±), and ~ ¼1;±. Let
q0;0 and ¼1;0 be the limits of q0;± and ¼1;±. q0;0 belongs to ^ Q. By properties (1)-(3) of
the previous lemma, for each ±;n;i, there exists a simplex ¹ Ki;±
n of Ki
n that contains both
~ gn;i(~ q0;±;(p0;±;p1;±); ~ ¼1;±) and pi;±
n , with the former belonging to its interior. By property (4)
of the previous lemma, ~ q0;0 = q0;0 and ~ ¼1;0 = ¼1;0.
By passing to a subsequence, we can assume that there exist multisimplices ¹ L of L and
¹ K of K such that for all ±, (~ q0;±;(p0;±;p1;±); ~ ¼1;±) belongs to the interior of ¹ L and its image
under ~ g belongs to the interior of ¹ K|hence ¹ K also contains (p0;±;p1;±). Going to the limit,
x0 ´ (q0;0;(p0;0;p1;0);¼1;0) belongs to ¹ L and its image under ~ g belongs to ¹ K; also (p0;0;p1;0)
belongs to ¹ K.
If we can show that x0 2 Q, then, by construction, ª is essential and x0 2 V (x¤); therefore
q0;0 2 U(q0;¤) and Q¤ is stable, which proves the theorem. To show that x0 belongs to Q,
it su±ces to prove that x± ´ (q0;0;(p0;±;p1;0);¼1;0) belongs to Q for all small ±, since Q is
closed. The remainder of the proof establishes this property.
5.9. Insiders' Strategies in a Quasi-Perfect Equilibrium. Next we derive the impor-
tant features of the insiders' strategies in quasi-perfect equilibria of the metagames, and their
limits as ± # 0.
Let ~ b";± be a sequence of completely mixed behavioral strategies converging to ~ b± against
which for each insider n and each information set of n in ~ ¡±, his continuation strategy as
given by b± is optimal. If n chooses sn 2 S0
n in the ¯rst stage then in the second stage he has
the option of revising this strategy to play something in T 0
n(±). Therefore, quasi-perfection
implies that player n will end up implementing sn with positive probability in ~ b±
n only if
this strategy is at least as good a reply against the sequence ~ b";± as the strategies in T 0
n(±).AXIOMATIC EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION 19
Likewise, player n has the option of playing a strategy in T 0
n(±) before he decides to play a
strategy in S1
n and even when he makes a choice among these strategies, he has the option
of choosing a strategy in T 1
n(±). Therefore, at the information set that follows his choice of
avoiding strategies in S0
n, ~ b±
n assigns a positive probability to moving on to a third stage and
then choosing a strategy in T 1
n(±) [ S1
n only if one of these strategies is at least as good a
reply against the sequence ~ b";± as all the strategies in T 0
n(±). Furthermore, at the information
set obtained after n avoids strategies in S0
n [ T 0
n(±), ~ b±
n assigns a positive probability to a
strategy sn in S1
n only if sn is at least as good a reply against the sequence ~ b";± as all the
strategies in S1
n [ T 1
n(±).
Let ~ ¾";± be a sequence of mixed-strategy pro¯les in ~ ¡± that is equivalent to the sequence
~ b";± of behavioral-strategy pro¯les. For each player n, his strategy ~ ¾";±
n in the sequence is a
mixture over his pure strategy set ~ Sn = Sn [T 0
n(±)[T 1
n(±). However, the implications of n's
strategy (for m's choices) depend on the choices of the outsiders through their implications
for strategies in T 0
n(±) and T 1
n(±). Each strategy ti
n(±) plays tn with probability (1 ¡ ±) and
with probability ± plays a strategy in P i
n that is determined by oi
n;1's strategy. In order to
fully capture the impact that oi
n;1 has on ti
n(±), let ¹ T i
n(±) be the union over all wi
n 2 W i
n of
the sets T i
n(±;pi
n(wi
n)). Let ¹ Sn = Sn [ ¹ T 0
n(±) [ ¹ T 1
n(±) and let ¹ §n be the set of mixtures over
¹ Sn.
The sequence ~ ¾";± induces a mixed strategy ¹ ¾";±
n in ¹ Sn for each n as follows. For each
sn 2 Sn, the probability ¹ ¾";±
n (sn) of sn is ~ ¾";±
n (sn); for each i = 0;1, wi
n 2 W i
n and tn 2 S0
n,










n). From player m's perspective it is
the sequence ¹ ¾";±
n , or rather its equivalent sequence in Pn, that matters for his choice.
5.10. The Induced Lexicographic Probability System. The next step uses these se-
quences to obtain a representation of the insiders' strategies as a lexicographic probability
system.
By Blume, Brandenburger, and Dekel [1, Appendix Proposition 2], we can construct for
each player n a lexicographic probability system (LPS) ¹ ¤±
n = (¹ ¾0;±
n ;:::; ¹ ¾
ln(±);±
n ) over his
strategies in ¹ Sn such that for each " in a subsequence converging to zero,
¹ ¾
";±









where (º0(");:::;ºln(±)¡1(")) is a sequence in R
ln(±)
++ converging to the origin. Moreover, ln(±)
depends only on the cardinality of ¹ Sn(±), which is independent of ±. Let l0;±
n be the ¯rst level
in ¹ ¤±
n at which some strategy in ¹ T 0
n(±) appears with positive probability. Let l1;±
n be the ¯rst
level of ¹ ¤±
n at which some strategy in S1
n [ ¹ T 1
n(±) appears with positive probability.
From the LPS ¹ ¤±
n construct an LPS ¤± = (q0;±
n ;:::;qln;±
n ) for ¡ where for each l, ql;±
n is an
enabling strategy in ¡ that is equivalent to ¹ ¾l;±
n . q0;±
n is a lexicographic best reply against20 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
¤±
m. If we let ¹ ¸i;±
n be the total probability of the strategies in ¹ T i
n(±) under ¹ ¾i;±
n , then for each
wi
n 2 W i
n, the total probability under ¹ ¾l
i;±
n
n of the strategies in T i
n(±;pi
n(wi








n) is the probability assigned to vertex wi







n;1) is, by de¯nition, pi;±
n , we have that level li;±











n , with ¸
li
n;±
n = ¹ ¸i;±
n ± and r
li
n;±
n 2 Pn; moreover, ¸0;±
n > 0
since by de¯nition l0;±
n is the ¯rst level l where a strategy in ¹ T 0
n(±) appears in in the support
of the ¹ ¾l;±
n . Also, since l1;±








We claim that for each l 6 l0;±
n , ql;±
n induces the equilibrium outcome against q0;±
m . Indeed,
since q0;±
m belongs to Q¤, the strategies in S0
n [T 0
n(±) are optimal against q0;±
m ; also, by quasi-
perfection, every strategy s1
n in S1
n, (resp. every strategy t1
n(±) in T 1




n) for some w1
n) appears at a level l 6 l0;±
n of ¹ ¤±
n must be a best reply to q0;±
m , since n
has to reject the strategies in T 0
n(±) before choosing a strategy in S1
n [ T 1
n(±). Thus for all
l 6 l0;±
n , ql;±
n is a best reply to q0;±
m . Since q0;±
m is a lexicographic best reply to ¤±
n, (~ qn(");q0;±
m )
is an equilibrium of the game ¡ for all small ", where
~ qn(") = (1 ¡ ") q
0;±














By genericity of payo®s, ¡ has ¯nitely many equilibrium outcomes, so each of these equilibria
induces the same equilibrium outcome|hence the claim follows. Three implications of this
claim are: (i) l1;±
n > l0;±
n ; (ii) the enabling strategy r
l0
n;±
n in the previous paragraph belongs
to P 0
n; (iii) all levels up to l0;±
n prescribe the same mixture at each information set on the
equilibrium path and di®er only at information sets excluded by (all of) m's equilibrium
strategies in Q¤.
5.11. Limit of the Lexicographic Probability System. Next we characterize the limit
of the LPS as ± # 0.
Take a subsequence of the ±'s such that the following properties hold for the associated
LPSs ¤±
n for each n: (i) li;±
n is independent of ± for each i, call it li
n; (ii) for each l 6 l1
n, the
face of Pn that contains ql;±
n in its interior, as well as the strategies for m in Sm that are best
replies to ql;±















n ) and a sequence (¹0(±);:::;¹kn¡1(±)) 2 Rkn converging to zero such that for
a subsequence of ±'s, ¾
l1
n;±
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Let k1
n be the ¯rst level k of this LPS where q
l1
n;k
n does not belong to P 0
n. Recall from the
previous section that q
l1
n;±















n ) = ¼1;±
n . Express r
l1
n;±




n , where for
i = 0;1, ri;±








n > 0 since q
l1
n;±
n does not belong to P 0
n. Going to
a subsequence, let ¸1
n be the limit of (¸
l1
n;±









n and let r1;0
n be the limit of
r1;±
n . Since the limit of p1;±
n is p1;0




n is expressible as a convex combination
³n(¸1
np1;0
n + (1 ¡ ¸1
n)r1;0
n ) + (1 ¡ ³n)· p0
n for some ³n > 0 and · p0
n 2 P 0
n. Moreover, since ¼1;0
n is
the limit of ¼1;±





n ) = ¼1;0
n .
For each ± in the subsequence used above, de¯ne now an LPS ^ ¤±
n = (^ q0;±







n , ^ ql;±
n = ql¡1;±
n if 0 < l 6 l1





n otherwise. The strategy ^ ql;±
n
is independent of ± for l = 0 and l > l1
n. Each level l < l1
n +k1



















n is a convex combination
³n(¸1
np1;0
n + (1 ¡ ¸1
n)r1;0
n ) + (1 ¡ ³n)· p0





n ) = ¼1;0
n . The next lemma
sets out the key properties of ^ ¤±
n that lead to a conclusion of our proof.
Lemma 5.4. For all small ±, the LPS ^ ¤±
n satis¯es the following properties.
(1) A strategy is at least as good a reply against ¤±
n as another only if it is at least as
good a reply against ^ ¤±
n.
(2) If ¸1
n < 1, then the strategy r1;0
n is a best reply to q0;0
m and is at least as good a reply
lexicographically against ^ ¤±
m as every strategy in S1
n.
(3) ¸1
n > 0 and every level l < l1
n + k1
n + 1 induces the equilibrium outcome against q0;0
m .
(4) The strategy ^ ql;±
n for l < l0






n < 1 are lexicographic best
replies against ^ q±
m.
Proof of Lemma. Suppose sm is a better reply against ^ ¤±
n than another strategy tm. We
show that sm is also a better reply against ¤±
n. Let l be the ¯rst level of ^ ¤±
n such that sm is
a better reply against ^ ql;±
m than tm. If l = 0 then for all small ±, sm is a better reply against
q0;±
n since ^ q0;±
n equals the limit q0;0
n of q0;±
n ; thus against ¤±
n, tm is a worse reply against the
very ¯rst level. If 0 < l < l1
n + 1 then obviously sm is better reply against ¤±
n than tm since
level l of ¹ ¤±
n corresponds to level l ¡ 1 of ¤±
n. Suppose then that l1
n + 1 6 l 6 l1
n + k1
n + 1.













n ). Thus, sm is a better reply against ¤±
n. This proves (1).
In the game ~ ¡± player n, when ¯nally making a choice among the strategies in S1
n [T 1
n(±),
would choose a strategy sn in S1
n with positive probability only if it is at least as good a
reply against ¤±
n as the other strategies in S1
n. Therefore, such a strategy would show up
with positive probability under level l1
n of ¤±
n (and hence in ^ ¤±
n) only if this is the case. This22 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON




n is positive, then the strategy r1;±
n is at least as good a reply
against ¤±
n as the strategies in S1
n. Recall that r1;0
n is the limit of r1;±
n and ¸1











n . Therefore, by point (1) of this lemma, r1;0
n is at least as
good a reply against ^ ¤±
n as strategies in S1
n if ¸1
n < 1. To show that it is also a best reply
against q0;0
m , suppose to the contrary that it is not. Then every strategy in T 1
n(±), regardless
of outsider o1
n;1's choice, is a better reply against q0;±
m than r1;±
n for all small ±, since for ± = 0
the strategies in T 1
n(±) are in P 0
n, which are best replies to q0;0
m . Therefore, quasi-perfection
implies that n would prefer to play the strategies in T 1
n(±) rather than implementing r1;0
n (or
r1;±
n when ± is small), which shows that (1 ¡ ¹l1
n;±)®l;±
n = 0 for all small ± and hence that
¸1
n = 1. This proves (2).
We turn now to (3). Every strategy ^ ql;±
n for l < l1
n+k1
n+1 belongs to P 0
n and is thus optimal
against q0;0
m , which belongs to Q¤
m. The strategy · p0





n ) which is chosen with positive probability is also in P 0
n and hence optimal
against q0;0
m . As we saw in the previous paragraph, if ¸1
n < 1, the strategy r1
n must also be
optimal against q0;0
m . Obviously q0;0
m is optimal against ^ ¤±
n since it is the limit of q0;±
m , which
by point (1) is optimal against ^ ¤±
n. Therefore, for all small ", (q0;0































n>0 is the indicator function. This is impossible if ¸1





convex combination of a strategy in P 0
n and one in P 1
n. Thus ¸1
n > 0. Moreover, since this
is a continuum of equilibria, genericity implies that all of them induce the same outcome.
Therefore, all strategies at levels preceding l1
n+k1
n+1 induce the equilibrium outcome against
q0;0
m .
Lastly we prove (4). By the previous paragraph, all strategies in P 0
n are optimal against
^ qk;±
m for k 6 l1
m+k1
m. Thus the optimality of a strategy in P 0





m . Obviously every strategy tn in the support of q0;0
n is optimal against ¤±
m for all




m . Now, if a strategy sn 2 S0





m , then for all small ±, the strategy t0
n(±) for some t0
n in the support of q0;0
n




m regardless of what outsider o0
n;1's choice is. Therefore, in ~ ¡±,
when player n, after making a provisional choice of sn, reconsiders his decision, he would
prefer to play t0
n(±) rather than sn; moreover, at every information set where he is choosing
among the strategies in T 0
n(±), he would prefer to play t0
n(±) rather than the duplicate s0
n(±)AXIOMATIC EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION 23
involving sn. Hence, the probability of sn is zero for all l < l0
n in ¤±




n is zero as well. Point (4) now follows. ¤
5.12. Final Step of the Proof. The proof can now be completed by invoking the results
established above.







































Observe that ¹ q0
n(") belongs to P 0
n for all " and it is a convex combination of p0;±
n and a
subset R0
n of strategies that are at least as good replies against ^ ¤±
m as other strategies in S0
n.
Likewise ¹ q1
n(") is a convex combination of p1;0
n , r1
n and a point in P 0
n such that the strategy
r1
n if it has a positive weight is at least as good a reply against ^ ¤±
m as other strategies in P 1
n.
There exists a small " such that a strategy sm is at least as good as a strategy tm against ^ ¤±
n





n(")) = ¹ ¼1
n(q1;0
n ) = ¼1;0 for all ", it follows that (q0;0;(p0;±;p1;0);¼1;0) belongs to Q. As
argued in subsections 5.2 and 5.3, proving that this point belongs to Q shows that in fact it
belongs to V (x¤) and hence that q0;0 in U(q0;¤).
This completes the proof of Theorem 5.1 when S1
n is not empty for either player n. In case
S1
n is empty for exactly one player n, as we said initially in the description of P and Q, we do
not have the factor P 1
n or ¦1
n. In the family of games ¡(±; ^ p), player n decides provisionally
in the ¯rst stage on the strategy in Sn to play and in the second stage gets to execute it or
switch to playing a strategy in Tn(±; ^ p). In the metagame, we do not have outsiders o1
n;j for
j = 1;2;3. The rest of the proof is essentially the same modulo these provisions.
6. Concluding Remarks
Like our article [13] on forward induction, the characterization in this paper is a step toward
a theory of equilibrium re¯nement using axioms adapted from decision theory. Theorem 5.1
is con¯ned to games in extensive form with perfect recall, two players, and generic payo®s,
but it suggests that an extension to more general games might be possible.
Previously, some proposed re¯nements selected equilibria with one or more desirable prop-
erties, like admissibility, subgame perfection, or sequential rationality. Other proposed re-
¯nements derived some properties from limits of equilibria of games with perturbed strate-
gies, such as perfect, quasi-perfect, and proper equilibria. However, a key step forward was24 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
Kohlberg and Mertens' [17] argument that an axiomatic development requires set-valued
re¯nements. Their program achieved remarkable success with Mertens' [22] de¯nition of a
stable set, which has the desirable properties 1, 2, 3 listed in Section 1 and others too, such
as ordinality [25] and immunity to splitting players into agents.
However, an axiomatic theory of re¯nement should be based on basic principles of rational
behavior in the game at hand, as in decision theory. This precludes reliance on perturbed
games obtained by perturbing players' payo®s or strategies. The challenge, therefore, has
been to establish why consideration of perturbed games yields the requisite decision-theoretic
properties.
Our answer here begins with Axiom C, which generalizes the invariance criterion of
Kohlberg and Mertens' [17] and the small worlds criterion of Mertens' [24], as explained
in subsection 3.3. Absent a strong invariance property like Axiom C, a re¯nement is vul-
nerable to `framing e®ects' depending on wider contexts in which the given game might be
embedded. In decision theory, such e®ects were examined by Savage [33], and in cognitive
psychology they play a prominent role in interpreting decisions by subjects in experiments,
as for instance in Kahneman and Tversky [16]. For a theory of thoroughly rational behavior,
however, an axiom should exclude framing e®ects. Axiom C does this by requiring a solution
of a game to be consistent with the solution of any metagame in which it is embedded. As
shown in Proposition 3.4, it is already true of any equilibrium that it is consistent with an
equilibrium of any metagame in which the game is embedded. Axiom C merely extends to
re¯nements this fundamental invariance property of equilibria.
Our answer continues with the proof of Theorem 5.2 in Appendix B. There it is shown
that a set Q¤ of equilibria in enabling strategies is stable i® the corresponding projection
map from the pseudomanifold Q to the space P of enabling strategies is essential. Using this
key property, the proof of Theorem 5.1 shows that for each equilibrium in a component of
undominated equilibria there exists a corresponding metagame for which the equilibrium is
the image of a quasi-perfect equilibrium in the metagame if and only if the projection map
is essential. Hence Axioms A, B, C imply that a solution is a stable set, and conversely due
to Mertens' previous proofs.
The answer to the `why' question above is thus that, given Axioms A and B, stability with
respect to perturbed games is equivalent to an analogous `stability' with respect to embedding
in metagames, as required by Axiom C. Because in practice every game is embedded in some
wider context, we view Axiom C's requirement that a re¯nement is immune to presentation
e®ects as the relevant criterion from the perspective of decision theory. This view is reinforced
by the facts that Nash equilibria satisfy Axiom C, and that together with Axioms A and B,
the implied re¯nement agrees with stability based on perturbed games.AXIOMATIC EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION 25
For a re¯nement satisfying the axioms, Theorem 5.1 establishes that a solution of a game
must be a component of its undominated equilibria, and that the component must be es-
sential. Because payo®s are assumed to be generic, all equilibria in the component have
the same paths of equilibrium play and thus the same distribution of outcomes. Therefore
the main implication for equilibrium re¯nements is that a predicted outcome distribution
should result from equilibria in an essential component of the undominated equilibria, and
in particular, from the quasi-perfect and sequential equilibria it necessarily contains. A sec-
ondary implication is that after deviations from equilibrium play, the continuations of all
equilibria in the component remain admissible and sequentially rational, where those that
are not sequential equilibria of the original game are justi¯ed by beliefs induced by quasi-
perfect equilibria of corresponding metagames that embed the given game. This resolves the
conundrum posed by Reny [30, 31, 32].
Appendix A. Enabling Strategies
In the normal-form representation of a game in extensive form, a player's pure strategy
speci¯es the actions chosen at his information sets in the game tree. However, outcomes
are not a®ected by a strategy's actions at information sets excluded by his previous actions.
One therefore considers equivalence classes of pure strategies. Say that two pure strategies
are outcome equivalent if the sets of terminal nodes they do not exclude are the same. For
instance, the game in Figure 1 is shown on the left side in extensive form and on the right
side in the `pure reduced normal form' (PRNF) introduced by Mailath, Samuelson, and
Swinkels [21]. In the PRNF each outcome-equivalent class of player 1's pure strategies is
identi¯ed by the terminal nodes it does not exclude, as indicated by labels of rows along the
left side; and each equivalence class of player 2's pure strategies is identi¯ed by the terminal
nodes it does not exclude, as indicated by labels of columns along the top. Because this
game has no moves by Nature, each row and column determine a unique outcome that is the
intersection of the row and column labels, shown as the corresponding entry in the matrix.
A similar example is shown in Figure 2 for the game tree of a signaling game. In this case,
each pro¯le of pure strategies determines a pair of outcomes such that the ¯rst or second
outcome occurs depending on whether Nature's initial move is up or down. For instance,
the outcome of 1's strategy abcd and 2's strategy aceg is a with probability p and c with
probability 1 ¡ p.
Say that a terminal node that is not excluded is an enabled outcome. A pure strategy of
a player enables outcome z if it chooses all his actions on the path to z. A player's mixed
strategy randomizes over his pure strategies, whereas a behavioral strategy randomizes over
actions at each of his information sets. A strategy of either kind induces a probability
distribution over outcome-equivalent classes of his pure strategies, and thus a distribution
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1—2: ab cdeg cdfh
ac a c c
aef a e f
bd b d d
bgh b g h
Figure 1. A game tree and its pure reduced normal form in which each pure














1—2: aceg acfh bdeg bdfh
abcd ac ac bd bd
abgh ag ah bg bh
efcd ec fc ed fd
efgh eg fh eg fh
Figure 2. The game tree of a signaling game and its pure reduced normal
form in which each pure strategy is identi¯ed by the terminal nodes it does
not exclude.
is an enabling strategy for player n if it is the distribution over enabled outcomes induced
by some mixed or behavioral strategy, i.e. pn(z) is the mixed strategy's probability of those
pure strategies that enable outcome z. The vertices of the polyhedron Pn of n's enabling
strategies correspond to outcome-equivalent classes of n's pure strategies in the PRNF, as
in Figures 1 and 2. Enabling strategies are minimal representations of strategic behavior in
games with perfect recall.6
Let p¤(z) be the probability that Nature's strategy enables outcome z, which is 1 if Nature
has no moves. Then for each pro¯le p 2 P =
Q
n Pn of players' enabling strategies, the
probability that outcome z results is °z(p) = p¤(z)
Q
n pn(z), because Nature and the players
randomize independently. The extensive form is therefore summarized by the multilinear
function ° : P ! ¢(Z) ½ RZ that assigns to each pro¯le of players' enabling strategies a
distribution over terminal nodes, including the e®ect of Nature's enabling strategy. Player
n's expected payo® is Gn(p) =
P
z °z(p)un(z). The game ¡ is therefore summarized by the
6Mertens [24, p. 554] introduces the mapping of mixed strategies to induced distributions on terminal
nodes. Koller and Megiddo [18] call them realization plans.AXIOMATIC EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION 27
multilinear function G : P ! RN that assigns to each pro¯le of players' enabling strategies
their expected payo®s. This summary speci¯cation is called the enabling form of the game.
Appendix B. Proofs of Propositions
B.1. Proof of Proposition 3.3. A multilinear map fn : ~ §n £ §o ! §n is completely
speci¯ed by its values at pro¯les of pure strategies. We use ^ fn to denote the restriction of
fn to the set ~ Sn £ So of pro¯les of pure strategies.
Proposition B.1. ~ G embeds G via a collection of multilinear maps f = (fn)n2N if and only
if for each player n there exists ~ Tn µ ~ Sn and a bijection ¼n : ~ Tn ! Sn such that for each
(~ s;so) 2 ~ S £ So and ~ tn 2 ~ Tn:
(1) ^ fn(~ tn;so) = ¼n(~ tn),
(2) ~ Gn(~ s;so) = Gn( ^ f(~ s;so)), where ^ f = ( ^ fn)n2N.
Proof. Suppose we have a game ~ G : ~ § £ §o ! RN[o and a collection of multilinear maps
fn : ~ §n £ §o ! §n, one for each n 2 N, such that conditions (1) and (2) of the proposition
are satis¯ed. Then, by condition (1) and multilinearity of fn for each n, for each ¯xed
¾o, fn(¢;¾o) is surjective because it maps the face spanned by ~ Tn homeomorphically onto
§n. Also, condition (2) and multilinearity of each fn imply that ~ G = G ± f. According to
De¯nition 3.2, therefore, ( ~ G;f) embeds G.
Now suppose that ( ~ G;f) embeds G. Let ¾o be a pro¯le of completely mixed strategies for
outsiders. Because fn is multilinear it induces a linear mapping fn(¢;¾o) from ~ §n to §n that,
by the de¯nition of an embedding, is surjective. Hence, for each sn 2 Sn there exists a pure
strategy ~ tn(sn) in ~ Sn that is mapped to sn by this linear map. We claim that fn(~ tn(sn);so) =
sn for all so 2 So. Indeed, observe that fn(~ tn(sn);¾o) =
P
so fn(~ tn(sn);so)¾o(so), where for
each so, ¾o(so) is the probability of so under ¾o. Therefore, since ¾o is completely mixed, if
fn(~ tn(sn);so) 6= sn for some so then fn(~ tn(sn);¾o), which is an average of values at vertices of
So, cannot be sn. Thus, fn(~ tn(sn);so) = sn for all so. Let ~ Tn ½ ~ Sn be a collection comprising
a di®erent pure strategy ~ tn(sn) for each sn 2 Sn and let ¼n be the associated bijection. De¯ne
^ fn : ~ Sn £ So ! §n by ^ fn(~ sn;so) = fn(~ sn;so). Then conditions (1) and (2) of the proposition
are satis¯ed. ¤
B.2. Proof of Proposition 3.4.
Proposition B.2. If ( ~ G;f) embeds G then the equilibria of G are the f-images of the
equilibria of ~ G.
Proof. Suppose (~ ¾;¾o) is an equilibrium of ~ G and let ¾ = f(~ ¾;¾o). For any insider n and his
strategy ¿n 2 §n there exists ~ ¿n 2 ~ §n such that fn(~ ¿n;¾o) = ¿n because fn(¢;¾o) is surjective28 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
by condition (a) of De¯nition 3.2 an embedding. Using condition (b),
Gn(¿n;¾¡n) = Gn(f(~ ¿n; ~ ¾¡n;¾o)) = ~ Gn(~ ¿n; ~ ¾¡n;¾o) 6 ~ Gn(~ ¾;¾o) = Gn(f(~ ¾;¾o)) = Gn(¾);
where the inequality obtains because (~ ¾;¾o) is an equilibrium of ~ G. Hence ¾ is an equilibrium
of G.
Conversely, suppose ¾ is an equilibrium of G. For each n, let ¼n be the bijection given by
Proposition 3.3. Let ~ ¾n be the strategy for insider n in ~ G de¯ned by ~ ¾n(~ tn) = ¾n(¼n(~ tn)) for
~ tn 2 ~ Tn and ~ ¾n(~ sn) = 0 for ~ sn = 2 ~ Tn. Since fn is multilinear, by condition (1) of Proposition
3.3, fn(~ ¾n;¢) = ¾n and thus f(~ ¾;¢) = ¾. Hence, it su±ces to show that there exists a
strategy pro¯le ¾o for outsiders such that (~ ¾;¾o) is an equilibrium of ~ G. By ¯xing the pro¯le
of insiders' strategies to be ~ ¾ one induces a game among outsiders. Let ¾o be an equilibrium
of this induced game among outsiders. To see that (~ ¾;¾o) is an equilibrium of ~ G, observe
that for each pure strategy ~ sn of an insider n:
~ Gn(~ sn; ~ ¾¡n;¾o) = Gn(fn(~ sn;¾o);¾¡n) 6 Gn(¾) = Gn(f(~ ¾;¾o)) = ~ Gn(~ ¾;¾o);
where the ¯rst and second equalities use the property f(~ ¾;¢) = ¾ established above, and the
inequality obtains because ¾ is an equilibrium of G. ¤
Appendix C. Proof of Theorem 5.2
Theorem C.1. (Q;@Q) is a pseudomanifold of the same dimension as (P;@P). Moreover,
Q¤ is stable if and only if the projection map ª : (Q;@Q) ! (P;@P) is essential.
Proof. The proof invokes genericity of payo®s by assuming that certain points and polyhe-
dra, identi¯ed as they arise during the proof, are in general position. See Appendix E for
elaboration of these genericity requirements.
For any set X, we write d(X) for its dimension. For any subset Tn of Sn, let Pn(Tn) be
the convex hull (in Pn) of the strategies in Tn. For simplicity, we write d(Tn) for d(Pn(Tn)).
See subsection 5.1 for additional notation used below.




n) be the set of pure strategies that map to ¼1
n under ¹ ¼1
n.




n) be the set of pure strategies s1





n be the set of information sets hn 2 Hn n H¤
n of player n such that at the last
information set h0
n 2 H¤
n that precedes hn, the action there leading to hn belongs to A¤
n,
which is the set of his equilibrium actions. If a subset T 0
n of S0
n is such that Pn(T 0
n) contains
an equilibrium in ¹ Q¤
n ´ ½n(¹ §n), then for each ¯rst information set hn 2 H0
n there exists a
strategy in T 0
n that enables hn. Let H1
n = Hn n (H¤
n [ H0
n).
Lemma C.2. Suppose T 0
n is a subset of strategies in S0
n such that Pn(T 0
n) contains an
equilibrium q¤
n in ¹ Q¤
n. If the strategies in T 0
n are at least as good replies against p0
m 2 P 0
m as
other strategies in S0
n, then all the strategies in S0
n are equally good replies against p0
m.AXIOMATIC EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION 29
Proof. Let ¦¤
n be the projection of P 0
n to RZ¤, where Z¤ is the set of terminal nodes reached
with positive probability under the equilibria in ¹ Q¤. Z¤ = Z0
n \ Z0
m. Consequently, the
payo® to a strategy s0
n against p0
m depends on s0
n only through its projection to ¦¤
n. Since
the projection of q¤
n|which is at least as good a reply as the other strategies in S0
n against
p0
m|belongs to the relative interior of ¦¤
n, the strategies in S0
n are equally good replies against
p0
m. ¤
Lemma C.3. Suppose that T 0
n is a subset of S0
n such that Pn(T 0
n) is a face of P 0
n containing
an equilibrium strategy in ¹ Q¤
n. For each tn 2 S0
nnT 0
n there exists an information set hn 2 H0
n
that tn enables and where the action chosen by it is avoided by all t0
n 2 T 0
n that enable hn.
Proof. Since Pn(T 0
n) is a face of P 0
n, which is itself a face of Pn, there exists a linear function
f : RZ ! R that is zero on Pn(T 0
n) and negative everywhere else on Pn. Fix pm in the interior
of Pm and de¯ne a payo® function ~ un for n by the equation: p0(z)pm(z)~ un(z) = f(ez) where
ez is the z-th unit vector in RZ. Then when n's payo® function is ~ un, the strategies in Pn(T 0
n)
are the best replies against pm. Take tn = 2 T 0
n. Since it is suboptimal against pm, there exists
an information set hn where the action a chosen by tn is suboptimal. Then hn does not
belong to H¤
n: indeed, since tn belongs to S0
n, a is an equilibrium action if hn 2 H¤
n; and since
Pn(T 0
n) contains an equilibrium strategy, there exists a strategy in T 0
n that enables such an
hn and chooses a. Let h0
n be the last information set preceding hn that belongs to H¤
n. Then
obviously the action chosen by tn at h0
n is an equilibrium action, as tn 2 S0
n, and thus hn
belongs to H0
n. Any strategy in T 0
n that enables hn avoids a, which proves the lemma. ¤
For the next lemma, it is worth recapitulating the exact de¯nition of the set ¦1
n. Recall
from subsection 5.1 that we ¯x a completely mixed enabling strategy ¹ pm for player m and
compute for each pn the total probability ´(pn) of reaching a terminal node in Z1
n under
(¹ pm;pn). Hn is a hyperplane in RZ1
n that separates the projection ªZ1
n(P 1
n) of P 1
n to RZ1
n
from the origin of RZ1
n and that has (p0(z)¹ pm(z))z2Z1
n as its normal and some " > 0 as its
constant. The function ¹ ¼1




Lemma C.4. For a strategy sn of S1
n, ¹ ¼1
n(sn) is a vertex of ¦1
n i® there exists a unique
information set hn 2 H¤
n with the property that sn enables hn and chooses a non-equilibrium
action there.
Proof. Let sn 2 S1
n be a pure strategy satisfying the condition of the lemma. We prove by
contradiction that ¹ ¼1
n(sn) is a vertex of ¦1




n(sn), is not a vertex of ¦1
n. We can express ¹ ¼1




n where J > 1 and for each 1 6 j 6 J, ¼1;j
n is a vertex of
¦1
n. For each j, since ¼1;j
n is a vertex of ¦1








n. Since ¸j > 0, s1;j
n cannot choose a non-equilibrium action at any h0
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in H¤
n that it enables; since it belongs to S1;j
n it must therefore enable hn; and it cannot
choose a di®erent non-equilibrium action from sn at hn. Observe now that the probability
´(sn) and ´(s1;j
n ) for all j are equal and exactly the probability that Nature and the strategy





n ). Modify s1;j
n to a strategy t1;j
n
so that at every information set other than the successors to hn, t1;j
n agrees with sn, and
at the successors to hn it agrees with s1;j




n and thus sn is a convex combination of the strategies t1;j
n . But that
is a contradiction since sn is a vertex of Pn and all the strategies t1;j
n are di®erent from one
another and from sn as they induce the points ¼1;j
n that are di®erent from one another and
from ¹ ¼1
n(sn) in Hn.
To prove the other way around, suppose sn is a strategy that, at a collection hk
n for k =
1;:::;K of at least two information sets in H¤
n, chooses a non-equilibrium action. For each k,
choose a strategy s1;k
n in S1
n that enables hk
n, agrees with sn there and at all its successors, but
at other hn 2 H¤







n(sn) cannot be a vertex of ¦1
n. ¤
For each T 0
n µ S0
n such that Pn(T 0
n) is a face of P 0
n and contains an equilibrium strategy
for n, let S1
n(T 0
n) be the subset of S1
n consisting of strategies s1
n such that there exists a
strategy t0
n 2 T 0
n that agrees with s0




except those in H¤
n where s1


















n) as T 1
n. The following lemma provides an important feature of the set Tn.
Lemma C.5. The strategies in Tn are the vertices of a face of Pn whose dimension is
d(Tn) ´ d(T 0
n) + d(ª1
n) + 1.
Proof. Let ^ T 1
n be the set of strategies t1
n in T 1
n such ¹ ¼1
n(t1
n) is a vertex of ª1
n. We will ¯rst
show that every tn 2 Tn n (T 0
n [ ^ T 1
n) is a±nely dependent on the strategies in T 0
n [ ^ T 1
n. Let
t1
n 2 Tn n (T 0
n [ ^ T 1
n). By Lemma C.4, there exist information sets h1
n;:::hK
n , K > 1, in H¤
n
such that for each k, t1
n chooses a non-equilibrium action ak at hk
n, and at each other hn 2 H¤
n
it chooses an equilibrium action. Fix t0
n 2 T 0
n that agrees with t1
n everywhere except at the
information sets hk
n, and their successors, for each k. For each k let t1;k
n be the strategy that
agrees with t1
n at hk
n and its successors, but everywhere else agrees with t0
n. Each t1;k
n belongs
to ^ T 1




n ¡ (K ¡ 1)t0
n. Thus, t1
n is an a±ne combination
of the strategies in T 0
n [ ^ T 1
n.
For each j = 0;:::;d(ª1
n), pick a strategy t1;j
n 2 S1
n(T 0
n) such that ¹ ¼1
n(t1;j
n ) is a vertex of
ª1
n. Let ~ T 1
n be the collection of these strategies. We show that strategies in ^ T 1
n n ~ T 1
n are
now a±nely dependent on the strategies in T 0
n [ ~ T 1
n. Fix t1
n 2 ^ T 1
n n ~ T 1
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there exists a unique information set hn 2 H¤
n enabled by t1
n and where it chooses a non-
equilibrium action. By construction of ~ T 1
n, there exists a subset (t1;j
n )
J




n) is expressible as an a±ne combination
P
j ¸j¹ ¼(t1;j
n ) with ¸j 6= 0 for all j. For each
j, s1;j
n enables hn and chooses a at hn; at all other information sets in H¤
n it chooses an
equilibrium action. Let t0
n 2 T 0
n be a strategy that agrees with t1
n everywhere except at hn
and its successors. For each j, let ~ t0;j
n be a strategy in T 0
n that agrees with t1;j
n everywhere
except at hn and its successors. Modify ~ t0;j
n to a strategy that agrees with ~ t0;j
n everywhere
except at hn and its successors, where it agrees with t0
n. By Lemma C.3, t0;j
n belongs to T 0
n






n ) and is a±nely dependent on the strategies in
T 0
n [ ~ T 1
n.
It follows now from the above arguments that the a±ne space A spanned by T 0
n [ ~ T 1
n
contains Pn(Tn) and that the dimension of Pn(Tn) is as stated. To ¯nish the proof of the
lemma, we show that Pn(Tn) is a face of Pn. Let Qn be the smallest face of Pn that contains
Pn(Tn). Suppose Qn 6= Pn(Tn). There exists a point pn in the relative of interior of Pn(Tn)







n , where the t0;i
n 's are in T 0
n and the t1;j











n , where now the t2;k
n 's are the vertices of Qn that are not
in Tn. Consider one of the t2;k
n 's. If it belongs to S0
n n T 0
n then by Lemma C.3 there is an
information set hn in H0
n that is enabled by t2;k
n where the action chosen by hn is avoided all
strategies in T 0
n that enable it; by the de¯nition, the strategies in T 1
n avoid this action as well.
This implies under the expression in (b) that the nodes following this action are assigned a
positive probability, but not under (a), which is impossible. If t2;k
n belongs to S1
n n T 1
n then
it must belong to S1
n(ª1
n) since otherwise under (b) ¹ ¼1
n(pn) = 2 ª1
n. Since sn = 2 T 1
n there exists
an information set hn 2 H0
n enabled by t2;k
n where the continuation strategy of t2;k
n coincides
with that of some tn 2 S0
n n T 0
n but not for any sn 2 T 0
n. As in the previous case, this too is
impossible. ¤
One corollary of the above result obtains when we take T 1
n to be S1
n and ª1
n to be ¦1
n. The
dimension of Pn is d(P 0
n) + d(¦1
n) + 1. Observe that P 1
n is a face of Pn i® ªZ1
n(P 1
n) is a face
of ªZ1
n(Pn), which is equivalent to saying that ¦1
n is homeomorphic to ªZ1
n(P 1
n). Thus, the
dimension of P 1
n equals d(¦1
n) if P 1
n is a face of Pn and otherwise it equals the dimension of
Pn.




2)), where for each n, Pn(T 0
n)\Q¤
n nonempty and ª1
n is a (possibly
empty) face of ¦1
n. Let An(T) be the set of points in Pn(T 0
n) such that the strategies in Tm are
all best replies. Let ~ T 0
n be the unique subset of T 0
n such that the interior of An(T) is contained
in the interior of Pn(~ T 0
n). Let ~ d¤
n(T) be the dimension of An(T). Since Pm(T 0
m) contains an
equilibrium strategy for m, and likewise for n, An(T) is a subset of A¤
n(T) = Pn(~ T 0
n) \ ¹ Q¤
n.32 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
Moreover, since the equilibrium strategy for m in Pm(T 0
m) is undominated, this last set A¤
n(T)
is the set Pn(~ T 0
n) \ Q¤
n as well.
Lemma C.6. If T 1
m is nonempty then An(T) is a proper face of A¤
n(T).
Proof. This follows from the genericity of payo®s. Fix t1
m 2 T 1
m. There exists an information
set hm 2 H¤
m where it chooses a non-equilibrium action a. If the path from each (x;a), for
x 2 hm that is reached under the equilibrium outcome, does not pass through an information
set hn 2 H0
n, then a would be suboptimal against every equilibrium ¹ Q¤
n and An(T) would be
empty. Thus, there exists a ¯rst information set hn 2 H0
n and nodes x 2 H¤
m and y 2 hn such
that (x;a) Á y and x is reached under the equilibrium outcome. Because A¤
n(T) is nonempty,
there is a strategy t0
n 2 ~ T 0
n that enables hn. Clearly, there must be multiple such strategies
that di®er in the continuation from hn, again by genericity. Perturbing the probabilities of
the terminal nodes following y does not a®ect the payo®s to strategies in T 0
m but they a®ect
the payo® to t1
m. Hence An(T) is a proper face of A¤
n(T). ¤
Let ^ T 1
m be the set of strategies sm in S1
m(T 0
m) n T 1
m such that: (i) sm is an equally good
reply against every point in P 0
n to which the strategies in Tm are equally good replies. Let
¹ T 1




m) that are best replies against every point
in An(T).
Let B¤
n(T) be the closure of the points in the interior of P 0
n against which the strategies
in Tm are equally good replies and at least as good replies as strategies in ¹ T 1
m. Let d¤
n(T)
be the dimension of B¤
n(T). If T 1
m is empty, let Bn(T) = P 0
n. Otherwise, let Bn(T) be the
set of points in P 0
n that are of the form ¸q0
n + (1 ¡ ¸)r0




n 2 Pn(T 0
n).
Lemma C.7. Suppose T 1




n(T). Each maximal face B0
n(T) of Bn(T) satis¯es exactly one of the following:
(1) The relative interior of B0
n(T) is contained in the relative interior of a maximal proper
face of P 0
n.
(2) There exists a strategy rm 2 ¹ T 1
m such that for each p0
n 2 B0
n(T), rm is an equally
good reply against every point of the form ¸p0
n +(1¡¸)r0
n, for 0 6 ¸ < 1, in B¤
m(T);
moreover, in this case, letting · R1
m be the set of such rm, for any rm 2 ¹ R1
m, if rm is
a best reply against a point in B¤
n(T) then every point in · R1
m is also a best reply
against this point.
(3) There exists a maximal proper face of Pn(T 0
n), say Pn(R0
n), such that for each qn 2
B¤
n(T), rn 2 Pn(T 0
n) and ¸ > 1, if ¸qn + (1 ¡ ¸)rn belongs to B0
n(T), then rn belongs
to Pn(R0
n); moreover, An(T) is contained in Pn(R0
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Proof. Let ~ P 0
n, ~ Pn(T 0
n), and ~ B¤




respectively. Let » : P 0
n £ ~ Pn(T 0
n) ! ~ P 0
n be the function »(p0
n; ~ r0
n) = p0




n) is a set of dimension d(T 0




n(T) + 1. Obviously ^ B(T) is a polyhedron. For each face ^ B0
n(T) of ^ Bn(T) and for
all points (p0
n; ~ r0
n) 2 ^ B0
n(T) at least one of the following holds: (i) p0
n belongs to the boundary
of P 0
n; (ii) there exists a strategy tm 2 ¹ T 1
m such that »(p0
n; ~ r0
n) belongs to the convex cone
spanned by the face of B¤
n(T) where this strategy tm is an equally good reply; (iii) ~ r0
n belongs
to the boundary of ~ Pn(T 0
n).
Observe now that Bn(T) is the projection of ^ Bn(T) onto the ¯rst factor. Obviously it is a
polyhedron. For each p0
n 2 Bn(T) and each ~ r0
n such that (p0
n; ~ r0




^ Bn(T) for all r0
n 2 B¤
n(T) \ Pn(T 0
n) and ¸ > 0. If the set B¤
n(T) is in generic position
(i.e. if the payo®s are in generic position), then for each p0
n 2 Bn(T), there exists ~ r0
n such
that all points in ^ Bn(T) that project to p0






n(T) \ Pn(T 0
n) and ¸ > 0. Since the set B¤
n(T) \ Pn(T 0
n) is the intersection of
Pn(T 0
n) with the a±ne space spanned by An(T), the dimension of Bn(T) is as asserted. The
enumerated properties of Bn(T) now follow directly from the corresponding points above;
only the last part of property (iii) needs a proof. Suppose r0
n belongs to a proper face Pn(R0
n)
of Pn(T 0
n) and An(T) is not contained in Pn(R0
n). If (p0
n;¸r0
n) belongs to ^ Bn(T), then so does
(p0
n;¸r0
n + ¹ r0
n) for ¹ r0
n 2 An(T) n Pn(R0
n) and ¸r0
n + ¹ r0




n(T) be the closure of the set of qn in the interior of Pn such that the strategies in
Tm are all equally good replies and at least as good as strategies in ^ T 1
m and S0
n n T 0
n. By
Lemma C.5, the dimension of the face spanned by Tm is d(T 0
m) + d(ª1
m) + 1. By genericity
of payo®s, the dimension of C¤
n(T) is therefore d(Pn) ¡ d(T 0
m) ¡ d(ª1
m) ¡ 1.
Let Cn(T) be the set of (p1
n;¼1
n) 2 P 1
n £ ¦1
n such that there exist p0
n 2 P 0
n, p2
n 2 Pn(T 1
n),




















n(T). On each maximal proper face C0 of Cn(T), exactly one of the following holds
for all (p1
n;¼1
n) in C0. If qn 2 C¤(T) is of the form
P
i ¹ipi
n for some p0
n 2 P 0
n and p2









n belongs to a maximal proper face of P 1
n;
(2) for i = 0 or i = 1, but not both, there exists sm 2 Si
mnT i
m, which actually belongs to
^ T i
m if i = 1, that is as good a reply as points in Tm against qn; moreover, in this case,
if i = 0, T 0
m and sm span a face of P 0
m of which Pm(T 0
m) is a maximal proper face; and
if i = 1, ª1
m and ¹ ¼1
n(sm) span a face of ¦1
m of which ª1
m is a maximal proper face.
(3) there exists a maximal proper face ª0 of ªn such that ¹ ¼1
n(p2
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Proof. We show that Cn(T) is a polyhedron of the stated dimension. Since the construction
is similar to that in the previous lemma, the enumerated properties can be proved just as
before. Let P 2
n be the convex hull of P 0
n and Pn(Tn). Using Lemma C.5, the dimension
of P 2
n is d(P 0
n) + d(ª1
n) + 1. Let ~ P 2
n and ~ Pn be the convex cones spanned by P 2
n and Pn,
respectively. De¯ne » : P 1
n £ ~ P 2
n ! ~ Pn by »(p1
n; ~ p2
n) = p1
n + ~ p2
n. Then for each ~ pn in the
interior of ~ Pn, »¡1(~ pn) is a set of dimension d(P 1
n) + d(P 0
n) + d(ª1
n) + 1 ¡ d(Pn). Letting
~ C¤
n(T) be the convex cone spanned by C¤
n(T), the dimension of ^ Cn(T) ´ »¡1( ~ C¤
n(T)) is
d(P 0
n) + d(P 1
n) + d(ª1
n) + 1 ¡ d(T 0
m) ¡ d(ª1
m). The function ¹ ¼1
n extends to ~ P n f0g. Cn(T)
is the image of ^ Cn(T) under the function Â : P 1
n £ ~ P 2





n + ~ p2
n))
and is thus a polyhedron. As will be shown in the course of the proof of the next lemma,
C¤
n(T) \ P 2
n ½ P 0
n. Therefore, C¤
n(T) \ P 2
n is the intersection of P 0
n with the a±ne space
spanned by B¤
n(T). For each (p1
n; ~ p2
n) 2 ^ Cn(T), the point (p1
n; ~ p2
n +¹q0
n) belongs to ^ Cn(T) for
all ¹ > 0 and q0
n 2 C¤
n(T) \ P 2




n(T) is in general position then for each (p1
n;¼1
n) in Cn(T) every point in its inverse image
under Â is expressible in this form. Therefore, the dimension of Cn(T) is as given. ¤
Let T be the collection of T's such that An(T), Bn(T) and Cn(T) are nonempty for each
n. For each T 2 T , let Qn(T) = An(T) £ Bn(T) £ Cn(T) for each n and let Q(T) =
Q1(T) £ Q2(T).
Lemma C.9. (q¤;p0;p1;¼1) belongs to Q i® it belongs to Q(T) for some T 2 T .




n) 2 Cn(T) for some T. Choose
r0
n 2 Pn(T 0
n) and ¸0
n such that q0





n(T). Also, ¯x ~ p0
n, r2












n belongs to C¤
n(T). Fix points ¹ q0
n and ¹ q1
n
in the interior of An(T) and B¤
n(T) for each n and consider for each 0 < " < 1, the LPS
(q¤; ~ q0("); ~ q1(")) where for each n, ~ q0
n(") = (1¡")¹ q0
n+"q0
n; and ~ q1




The strategies in Tn are equally good replies to q¤
m; ~ q0
m("); ~ q1
m(") for all ". We show that these
strategies are lexicographic best replies to (q¤; ~ q0("); ~ q1(")) for all small ", which proves that
(q¤;p0;p1;¼1) belongs to Q.
Observe ¯rst that for all ", a strategy in S0
n n T 0
n is an equally good reply against q¤
m and
~ q0
m(") as strategies in T 0
n, by Lemma C.2, and no better a reply against ~ q1
m(") by construction
of C¤
n(T). Now for a strategy s1
n in S1
n, consider the strategy t1
n that agrees with s1
n at every




agrees with some t0
n in T 0
n. Since strategies in T 0
n are at least as good as the other strategies
in S0
n, clearly t1






n belongs to S1
n(T 0
n). If it belongs to ^ T 1
n, then it is an equally good reply as strategies
in Tn against q¤
m and ~ q0
m(") and no better reply a reply against ~ q1
m(") by de¯nition. If it
belongs to ¹ T 1
n then it is an equally good reply to q¤
m, no better reply against ~ q0
m(") for allAXIOMATIC EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION 35
", and a strictly worse reply against ~ q1
m(") for all small ", again by construction, since it is
an inferior reply against ¹ q1
n which belongs to the interior of B¤
n(T). Finally, if it belongs to
S1
n(T 1
n) n (^ T 1
n [ ¹ T 1
n) then it is no better a reply against q¤
m and an inferior reply to ~ q0
m(") for
all small ", since it is an inferior reply to ¹ q0
n by construction of An(T). Thus the strategies
in T are lexicographic best replies to (q¤; ~ q0("); ~ q1(")) for all small ".
Before proceeding to prove the converse, we use the above argument to show that the
intersection of C¤
n(T) with the convex hull P 2
n of P 0
n with Pn(Tn) is in fact the intersection
F of P 0
n with the a±ne space spanned by B¤
n(T)|a fact that was asserted, but not proved,
in the course of the proof of the previous lemma. Take a point q1
n in C¤
n(T) \ P 2. If it
belongs to P 0
n, then in fact it belongs to F by the de¯nitions of B¤
n(T) and ^ T 1
m. If it does
not belong to P 0
n, then it assigns a positive weight to some strategy s1
n 2 T 1
n. The above
argument applied when using this q1
n shows that q¤




strategies in Tn and S0
n are best replies to q¤
m. Observe now that ~ q1
n(") is a convex combination
of strategies in S0
n and T 1
n. Therefore, for all small ±, ((1 ¡ ± ¡ ±2)q¤
n + ±~ q0
n(") + ±2~ q1
n(");q¤
m)
is an equilibrium if " is small as well. But these points induce di®erent outcomes because
~ q1
n(") has a non-equilibrium strategy, namely one in T 1
n, in its support, which is impossible.
Thus, C¤
n(T) \ P 2
n = F as claimed.

















n is a best reply
against (q¤;q0;q1); and r2
n, if ¹2
n > 0, is a best reply against q¤
n and a weakly better reply
against (q¤;q0;q1) than all the strategies in P 1
n. Let Q0






n in its interior. Let Q1
n be the face of P 1
n that contains r2
n in its interior if
¹2
n > 0. Let T 0
n be the set of strategies tn in S0
n such that if tn enables a ¯rst information set
hn 2 H0
n then the choices from there on prescribed by t0
n coincide with the choices dictated
by some vertex of Q0
n or Q1
n that enables hn. Observe that each t0
n 2 T 0
n is optimal against
(q¤;q0;q1). If ¹2
n > 0, let ª1
n be the face of ¦1
n that contains ¹ ¼1
n(r2
n) in its interior; otherwise
let ª1
n be the empty set.
We can now assume without loss of generality that the strategies in Q0
n and Q1
n are equally
good replies against (q¤
m;q0
m;q1
m) and hence best replies. Indeed, if for i either 0 or 1, if the
strategies in Q1
n do not yield the same payo® against qi
m as those in Q0
n, modify qi
m as follows:
pick a point · r0
m in the face ~ Q0
m of Q0
m containing q¤
m in its interior such that the strategies
in Q0
n are equally good replies, the strategies in Q1
n do strictly better than the strategies in
Q0
n and at least as well as the other strategies in S1
n. There exists a unique ºi
m 2 [0;1] such
that the strategies in Q0
n and Q1





Thus, our assumption is without loss of generality.
Since the strategies in Q0
n and Q1
n are best replies. There remains to show that every
strategy in Sn(T 0
n;ª1
n) is a best reply against (q¤
m;q0
m;q1
m). Fix sn 2 Sn(T 0
n;ª1
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that it is a best reply it is su±cient to show that an information set hn that is enabled by sn
is enabled by some vertex of either Q0
n or Q1
n and that this vertex agrees with sn's choice an
there. Suppose that this hn is in H¤
n and an 2 A¤
n, or hn belongs to H0
n; then obviously some
strategy in Q0
n or Q1
n enables hn and chooses an, by the de¯nition of T 0
n. If hn 2 H¤
n and
an = 2 A¤
n or hn follows some information set in H¤
n by the choice of a non-equilibrium action,
then some strategy in Q1
n enables it and chooses this action, since otherwise sn enables a
terminal node that is excluded by all strategies in Q1
n, contradicting the assumption that
¹ ¼1
n(sn) 2 ª1
n. Thus sn is a best reply and (q¤;q0;q1) belongs to Q(T). ¤
Lemma C.10. Q is a pseudomanifold of dimension ^ d ´ d(P).
Proof. Each Q(T) is a polyhedron of dimension ^ d. By the previous lemma Q = [T2T Q(T).
Therefore, Q has dimension ^ d. To show that Q is a pseudomanifold, we establish three
facts for each (q¤;(p0;p1);¼1) that belongs to some Q(T): (1) if (q¤;(p0;p1);¼1) belongs to
the interior of Q(T), then it does not belong to the interior of Q(R) for R 6= T; (2) if
(q¤;(p0;p1);¼1) is a generic point in a maximal proper face Q0 of Q(T), then it does not
belong to Q(R) for any R 6= T if (p0;p1) 2 @P, and it belongs to the boundary of Q(R) for
exactly one other R 6= T if (p0;p1) = 2 @P; moreover in the latter case it belongs to the interior
of a maximal proper face of this Q(R) as well; (3) given T;R 2 T , there exists a ¯nite chain
T = T(0);:::;T(k) = R such that for each 0 · j · k¡1, Q(T(j))\Q(T(j +1)) is a subset
of a maximal proper face of each and has a nonempty interior in this face.
Fix T = (T 0;ª1) and x = (q¤;(p0;p1);¼1) 2 Q(T). For each n, choose q0















We start with (1). Suppose now that x belongs to the interior of Q(R) for some R. We
show that R = T. Since x belongs to the interior of Q(T), we can assume that every strategy
in S0
m n T 0
m is inferior to q1
n. Let sm be a strategy in S0
m n T 0
m. Since sm is an inferior reply
against q1
m compared to the strategies in T 0
n, by Lemma C.3 there exists an information set
hn 2 H0
n that is enabled by sn where the action chosen by sn is suboptimal and di®erent
from the action chosen by every tn 2 T 0
n that enables hn. But the posterior belief over the
terminal nodes following hn computed from q1
m can be computed from ¼1
m. This implies that
for any q0
m such that ¹ ¼1
m(q0
m) = ¼1
m, sn is an inferior strategy. Therefore, (p1
m;¼1
m) cannot
belong to Cm(R) unless R0
m µ T 0
m. Moreover, if R0
m ( T 0
m, then it cannot belong to the
interior of Cm(R), since strategies in T 0
m n R0
m are also optimal. Thus, if x belongs to the
interior of Q(R), R0
m = T 0
m for each m. If ª1
m is empty, this implies that Rm = Tm. Suppose
now that ª1





m) is in the interior of ª1
m. Observe that ¹ ¼1
n(r1
m) can be computed uniquely from p1
m
and ¼1
m by taking the line segment from ¹ ¼1
m(p1
m) through ¼1
m and computing the boundary
point of this line. This implies that if x belongs to the interior of Q(R), then Rm = (T 0
m;ª1
m).
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We turn to point (2). Suppose now x belongs to the relative interior of a maximal proper
face of Q(T) and that (p0;p1) belongs to @P. Then if it belongs to another Q(R) it cannot be
in the interior and must belong to the boundary. The arguments of the previous paragraph
apply to show that x does not belong to the interior of a maximal face of Q(R): indeed,
it relied on strategies in S0
m n T 0
m being inferior to q1
n, and q0
n (resp. q1
n) not belonging to
the boundary of Bn(T) (resp. Cn(T)). Thus x must belong to a face of dimension at most
^ d ¡ 2. The set of such points in this maximal proper face of Q(T) then has dimension at
most ^ d ¡ 2, i.e. it is nongeneric.
Suppose that x belongs to the relative interior of a maximal proper face of Q(T) but
that (p0;p1) is in the interior in P. Then for exactly one n, just one of the following hold:
(2a) q¤
n belongs to the boundary of An(T); (2b) p0
n belongs to the boundary of Bn(T);
(2c) (p1
n;¼1
n) belongs to the boundary of Cn(T). We start with (2c). By the properties we
proved for Cn(T) in Lemma C.8, and since (p0;p1) = 2 @P, either property (ii) or property




n)) is de¯ned as follows. If the strategy ri
m identi¯ed there belongs
to S0
m, then R0
m is the vertex set of the face spanned by ri









m = T 0
m and ©1
m is a face of ¦1
m that has ª1
m as




m. Under property (iii) x belongs to the boundary of





n is the maximal proper face of ª1
n identi¯ed
there.
Suppose x satis¯es (2b). Then by the properties we proved for Bn(T) in Lemma C.7,
either property (ii) or property (iii) of that lemma holds. Under property (ii) let ~ R1
m be the
set of strategies in ~ T 1
m that are now best replies against q0
n. Let ~ ©1
m be the smallest face of
¦1
m that contains ª1
m and the vectors ¼1
m(~ r1
m) for ~ r1
m 2 ~ R1




m) are equally good replies against q0
n. Moreover by the genericity of x, if one of these
strategies is a best reply against a point in B¤
n(T) then all these points are best replies as
well. For each face ©1
m of ~ ©1
m that has ª1
m a maximal proper face, choose a strategy rm(©1
m)
that maps to a vertex of ©1
m that is not contained in ª1
m. The set of points in B¤
n(T) against
which the strategies in ~ Rm are as good replies as Tm has dimension d¤
n(T)¡1. However, the
set of points in C¤
n(T) where two or more of these strategies rm(©1
m) are also best replies
has dimension d(Pn) ¡ d(T 0
m) ¡ d(ª1





m)) the set of (p1
n;¼1
n) that lies in the intersection Cn(T) \ Cn(R) \ Cn(R0)




n(T) ¡ 1 or less. This implies that generic (p1
n;¼1
n) in Cn(T)
belongs to at most one of these sets. Moreover, if x belongs to Q(R), then it belongs to
the boundary of Q(R): indeed the point Á1
m in ©1
m such that ¼1




m is uniquely determined, as we argued above; since this point belongs to ª1
m,
which is a face of ©1
m, x indeed belongs to the boundary of Q(R) if it belongs to Q(R). To38 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
¯nish the proof of this case, we now show that x belongs to at least one Q(R). Take an ~ r1
m
that yields the highest payo® against q1
n among the strategies in ~ R1
m. If this payo® is higher
than the payo® to the strategies in T 0
m, pick a point ¹ q0
n in the interior of B¤
n(T) and replace
q1
n with ~ q1
n(") ´ (1¡")q1
n+"¹ q0
n where " is the unique number where the strategies T 0
m and ~ r1
m
are equally good replies; then x belongs to some Q(R) that has ¼1
m(~ r1
m) as an extra vertex.
If the payo® to ~ r1
m is lower, take a point ¹ q0
n in P 0
n against which the strategies in T 0
m are
equally good and worse than the strategies in ~ R1
m and repeat the argument to show that x
belongs to Q(R).
Finally, suppose that x satis¯es (2a). Let A0
n be a maximal proper face of An(T) that
contains q¤
n in its interior. Let · R1
m be the set of strategies · rm in S1
m(T 0
m) n (T 1
m [ ^ T 1
m [ ¹ T 1
m)
that are best replies against all the points in A0
n. Observe that · R1
m is nonempty if q¤
n belongs
to the interior of Pn(~ T 0
n). Indeed, in this case, the interior of A0
n which is a face of An(T) is
contained in the interior of Pn(~ T 0
n), which implies that some strategy in S1
m is now optimal
against every point in this face. Let R0
n be the set of subsets R0
n of T 0
n such Pn(R0
n) is a




n. Observe that R0
n is nonempty if q¤
n
belongs to the boundary of Pn(~ T 0
n).
Let · ©1
m be the smallest face of ¦1
m that contains ª1
m and the vectors ¼1
m(· r1
m) for · r1
m 2 · R1
m.
For each face ©1
m of · ©1
m that has ª1
m as a maximal proper face, choose a strategy · r1
m(©1
m)
that maps to a vertex of ©1
m that is not contained in ª1







m as a maximal face. Since A0
n is a face of An(T),
~ d¤
n(R) = ~ d¤
n(R0) = ~ d¤
n(T) ¡ 1. Since the strategies in · R1
m are inferior replies to points in the
interior of An(T), B¤
n(R) if nonempty has dimension d¤
n(T)¡1. Therefore, if Bn(R) 6= Bn(R0),
their intersection with Bn(T) has codimension 1 in Bn(T) and a generic x cannot belong to
two of these sets at once. On the other hand, if Bn(R) = Bn(R0) then an argument similar to
that under case (2b) shows that generic (p1
n;¼1
n) 2 Cn(T) can belong to at most one of these
sets, Cn(R) and Cn(R0). Hence a generic x belongs to at most one of these sets. Likewise, for
















m)), the intersection of Bn(T) with Bn(R) and Bn(R0) has codimension
at least one. Thus x belongs to at most one set Q(R). To ¯nish the proof of this part, we
show that it belongs to at least one such set.
Suppose that the interior of A0
n is contained in the interior of Pn(~ T 0
n). Let · r1
m(©1
m) be
a strategy that is a lexicographic best reply to (q0
n;q1
n) among the strategies in this class.
If · r1
m(©1
m) is a lexicographic weakly better (resp. strictly inferior) reply against (q0
n;q1
n) we
choose a point ¹ q0
n in the interior of Pn(~ T 0
n) against which the strategy · r1
m(©1
m) is at least as
good as the other points in this class and inferior (resp. superior) to strategies in T 0
m. The
strategies in T 0
m and Sm(T 0
m;©1
m) are now equally good replies against some average of q0
n and
¹ q0
n, as well as some average of q1
n and ¹ q0
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Suppose now that q¤
n belongs to the boundary of Pn(~ T 0
n), then R0
n is nonempty. There
exists · R0
n in R0
n and a point ~ q0
n 2 Bn(T) that is a convex combination of p0
n and some point
in Pn( · R0
n). If the strategies in · R1
m are weakly inferior against ~ q0
n to the strategies in Tm,




m)). Otherwise, as above, we can replace ~ q0
n by a convex
combination ¹ q0
n of ~ q0
n with a point in the interior of An(T) and replace q1
n with an a point
¹ q1
n that is a convex combination of q1
n with either ~ q0
n or a point in the interior of An(T)
depending on whether the strategy · r1
m(©1
m) that is superior to the strategies in Tm against
~ q0
n is inferior or weakly superior in comparison against q1
n. The points ¹ q0
n and ¹ q1
n belong to
Bn(T 0) and Cn(T 0) respectively, where T 0 = ((Tn;ª1
n);(Tm;©1
m) and thus x belongs to Q(T 0).
We turn now to (3). Given Q(T) and Q(R) for T = (T 0;ª0) 6= R = (R0;©1), we will ¯rst
construct a sequence T = T(1);:::;T(k) = ~ T where ~ T = ((~ T 0
n;;);(~ T 0
m;;)). And, likewise
one from R to ~ R. Then we will show how to construct a sequence from ~ T to ~ R.
In case ~ T 0
n 6= T 0
n for some n, let T = T(0);:::;T(k) be a sequence where for each j > 0,




n)) with Pn(T 0
n(j))£Pm(T 0
m(j)) being a maximal proper face of
Pn(T 0
n(j¡1))£Pm(T 0
m(j¡1)), and Tn(k) = ~ T 0
n for each n. This sequence generates a sequence
of polyhedra Q(T) = Q(T(0));:::;Q(T(k)) where for each j > 0, the intersection of Q(T(j))
with Q(T(j¡1)) is contained in a maximal proper face of each and has a nonempty interior.




m)). In case ª1
n




m(l)) = (;;;) be a sequence
such that for each 1 6 j · l, ª1
m(j)£ª1
m(j) is a maximal proper face of ª1
n(j¡1)£ª1
m(j¡1),
and ª1(l) = ;. This way we can connect Q(~ T(k)) with Q(~ T) where ~ T = ((~ T 0
n;;);(~ T 0
m;;)).
Now we show how to connect ~ T with ~ R for two sets T;R in T . Because Q¤
n is connected for




m(l)) = ~ R0
n where for each
1 6 j 6 l, either Pn(S0
n(j)) £ Pn(S0
m(j)) is either a maximal proper face of Pn(S0
n(j + 1))
or vice versa and for each n, Q¤
n intersects the interior of the set Pn(S0
n(j)). This generates
a sequence Q0;:::Qj, where Qj = ((S0
n(j);;);(S0
m(j);;)). Thus we have constructed a
sequence of sets in T that connect T and R. ¤
This concludes the proof of the ¯rst statement in the theorem. Next we prove the second
statement, invoking now the original de¯nition of a stable set in Mertens [22].
Lemma C.11. Q¤ is a stable set if and only if the projection map ª : (Q;@Q) ! (P;@P) is
essential.
Proof. Let Y = [0;1] £ P. For each 0 < " 6 1, let Y" = [0;"] £ P and let @Y" be the
boundary of Y". Each (";p) 2 Y de¯nes a strategic game G(";p) where the strategy set is P
but where the payo® from an enabling strategy pro¯le q is the payo® in G from the pro¯le
(1 ¡ ")q + "p. If q is an equilibrium of G(";p), we say that (1 ¡ ")q + "p is a perturbed
equilibrium of G(";p). Let E be the closure of the set of (";p;q) such that (";p) 2 Y1 n @Y140 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
and q is a perturbed equilibrium of G(";p). Let µ be the projection map from E. For each
subset E of E and each 0 < ", let (E";@E") be E \ µ¡1(P";@P").
In [11] we show that there exists 0 < ¹ " 6 1 and a ¯nite number of subsets E1;:::;EK
of E such that for each 0 < " 6 ¹ ": (i) (Ek
";@Ek
") is a pseudomanifold (in fact an orientable
semi-algebraic homology manifold) of dimension d(P)+1 for each k; (ii) Ek
" \Ej
" ½ µ¡1(@P1)
for k 6= j; (iii) [kEk
" = E". We will assume that ¹ " is small enough such that for each player
n, and each (";p;q) 2 E¹ ", if a strategy sn is optimal against a strategy q in ¡, then it is
optimal against some point in ¹ Q¤
n, the component of equilibria containing Q¤
n.
One could de¯ne the set of perturbations for the normal form of the game and consider the
graph of the equilibria over this space. In [7] we show that there exists a neighborhood of §¤
that is disjoint from the other components of ¡ and an " > 0 such that the set of "-perfect
equilibria in this neighborhood (viewed as points in the graph of equilibria) is connected. The
corresponding set of "-perfect equilibria in enabling strategies is therefore connected. Thus
there exists some k such that Ek
0 = f0g£Q¤ and for each j 6= k, E
j
0\(f0g£Q¤) is empty. For
simplicity in notation we refer to this Ek as simply E. According to Mertens' [22] de¯nition,
Q¤ is stable i® the projection µ from E" to Y" is cohomologically essential for some (and
then all smaller) 0 < " 6 ¹ ". Moreover, since E" is a pseudomanifold, µ is cohomologically
essential i® it is essential in homotopy [23, Theorem, Section 4E]. By [11, Lemmas A.3, A.4],
this is equivalent to saying that ª is essential in the sense we have used it in Section 5.
It is now su±cient to prove that ª is essential i® the projection µ from E" to Y" is essential





n. Then we have that (( ~ Pn;@ ~ Pn);(Pn;@Pn);Ân) is a ball-bundle. Let Â
be the product map Â1 £ Â2; then (( ~ P;@ ~ P);(P;@P);Â) is a ball-bundle too. Let ^ Y" =
[0;"] £ ~ P. Then Â induces a map hY : ^ Y1 ! Y1 by h(";¸;p0;p1) = (";Â(¸;p0;p1)). Now
((^ Y";@ ^ Y");(Y";@Y");hY) is a ball-bundle. Let ~ E be the set of all ((";¸;p0;p1);q) 2 ^ Y1 £ P
such that hE(";¸;p0;p1;q) ´ (";Â(¸;p0;p1);q) 2 E. Then also (( ~ E";@ ~ E");(E";@E");hE) is a
ball-bundle. Moreover, letting ~ µ be the projection from ~ E to P, we have that hY ± ~ µ = µ±hE.
Therefore, by the Thom Isomorphism Theorem, µ is essential i® ~ µ is; cf. [23, Appendix IV.3].
Let ^ E be the closure of the set of (";¸;p0;p1;q;¼1(q)) such that (";¸;p0;p1;q) 2 ~ E and
¸ 6= 0. By the strong excision property, the natural projection ^ Á from ^ E to ~ E induces
an isomorphism of their cohomology groups. Let ^ µ be the projection from ^ E to ^ Y . Then
^ µ = ~ µ ± ^ Á. Therefore, ~ µ is essential i® ^ µ is.
Let ´ : ^ E ! R3
+ be the projection map ´(";¸;(p0;p1);q;¼1) = (";¸). Let D = ´( ^ E).
By the generic local triviality theorem, there exists a partition of D into a ¯nite number of
connected subsets D0
1;:::;D0
l , and for each D0
i a semi-algebraic ¯bre pair (Fi;@Fi), a home-
omorphism hi : D0
i £ (Fi;@Fi) ! (´¡1(D0
i);´¡1(D0
i) \ @ ^ E) such that ´ ± hi is the projection
from D0
i £Fi to D0
i. Since the sets Di are semi-algebraic, if necessary by decomposing themAXIOMATIC EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION 41
into smaller sets, we can assume that the closure of each of these sets is homeomorphic to a
simplex. There now exists an i, say 1, such that the closure Di of D0
i is homeomorphic to a
3-simplex and contains [0; ~ "] £ f(0;0)g for some ~ " < ¹ ".
Let (^ Y (D1);@ ^ Y (D1)) ´ (D1;@D1) £ (P;@P) and let ^ E(D1) be the closure of the inverse
image of D1 £ F1 under h1. Let ^ µ(D1) : ( ^ E(D1);@ ^ E(D1)) ! (^ Y (D1);@ ^ Y (D1)) be the
projection. We claim that ( ^ E"(D1);@ ^ E"(D1)) is an orientable homology manifold (and hence
a pseudomanifold) for all small ", where E" is the inverse image under µE"(D1) of the points
("0;¸)inD1 with e0 6 ". The set ^ E was constructed from the set E, which is an orientable
homology manifold, by constructions involving ball bundles and homeomorphisms. Thus,
^ E is an orientable homology manifold. So our claim is proved if we show that ^ E(D1) n
@ ^ E(D1) is path-connected. There exist 0 < ^ "0 < ~ " and integers rn > 1 for each n such
that (";¸) 2 D1 if 0 < " < ^ "0 and 0 · ¸n · "rn¡1. Now given 0 < ^ " 6 ^ "0 and given
two points x(0) and x(1) in ^ E^ "(D1) n @ ^ E^ "(D1), connect them by a semi-algebraic curve
x(t0) = ("(t0);¸(t0);p0(t0);p1(t0);q(t0);¼1(q(t0))) in ^ E¹ " n @ ^ E¹ " as t0 goes from 0 to 1. For each
t0, express q(t0) as "(t0)(¸(t0)p0(t0) + (1 ¡ ¸(t0))p1(t0) + (1 ¡ "(t0))r(t0) where r(t0) is a best
reply to q(t0). The correspondence from [0;1] to ¹ Q¤ that assigns to each t0 the set of q¤
such that r(t0) is a best reply to q¤ is a nonempty, compact convex valued, and upper semi-
continuous correspondence. Therefore, there exists a path ((t0(t);q¤(t)) in the graph of this
correspondence with t0(0) = 0 and t0(1) = 1. We will now view the path x(t0) as the path
x(t) ´ x(t0(t)).
Choose a positive " such that " + "rn < ^ ". For each n, modify xn(t) to the vector
~ xn(t) = (" + "











"q¤(t) + "rn"(t)(1 ¡ ¸(t))p0(t)
" + "rn"(t)(1 ¡ ¸(t))
;







Then ~ x(t) belongs to ^ E(D1)n@ ^ E(D1) for all t. Moreover, for t = 0;1, x(t) and ~ x(t) can now
be connected by a path ^ x(t;s) de¯ned as follows. For s 2 [0;1], let kn(s) = min(1;2s)rn and
then:









(2s ¡ 1)+" + "kn(s)"(t)





n(t) + "rn"(t)(1 ¡ ¸n(t))p0
n(t)
(2s ¡ 1)+" + "kn(s)"(t)(1 ¡ ¸n(t))
;










Thus ^ E(D1)n@ ^ E(D1) is connected and hence an orientable homology manifold of dimension
d(P) + 3. ^ Y (D1) is a full-dimensional subset of Y¹ ". Therefore ^ µ is essential i® ^ µ(D1) is
essential.
Since ( ^ E^ "(D1);@ ^ E^ "(D1)) is an orientable homology manifold, (F1;@F1) is now an orientable
homology manifold of dimension d(P) and hence an orientable pseudomanifold. Moreover,
for each (";¸) 2 D0
1, with 0 < " 6 ^ ", letting ( ^ E";¸;@ ^ E";¸) ´ h
¡1
1 (f";¸g£(F1;@F1)) we have
that ^ µ is essential i® ^ µ";¸, the projection map ( ^ E";¸;@ ^ E";¸) ! (P;@P), is essential.
Let L be the set of (";¸) 2 D1 such that ¸n = "r for some r > rn for each n. Let ^ E(L) be
the closure of the inverse image of Lnf(0;0)g under h1. Let @ ^ E(L) be the inverse image of
L£@P under the projection map µ(L) from ^ E(L) to L£P. For each (";¸) 2 L, (E";¸;@E";¸)
is (µ(L))
¡1(f(";¸)g£(P;@P)). Our next objective is to show that (Q;@Q) equals the set of
(q¤;(p0;p1);¼1) such that (0;0;(p0;p1);q¤;¼1) belongs to E0;0(L). Given (0;0;(p0;p1);q¤;¼1)
in ^ E(L) there exists a sequence ("(k);¸(k);(p0;p1)(k);q(k);¼1(k)) in ^ E(L)nE0;0 converging






n(k)+ (1 ¡ ¸(k))p1
n(k)), where ¹1
n and ¸(k) converge to zero, q0
n(k) belongs to P 0
n
and converges to q¤
n, and r1




n > 0 are best replies
to q(k) for all k. By going to a subsequence, the faces to whose interior q0
n(k) and r0
n(k)





n. As in the proof of Theorem 5.1, there exists a level li
n for each i = 0;1 that is
expressible as a convex combination of p0
n and another strategy. Since ¸(k) converges to zero,
l0
n < l1
n. As in the proof of Theorem 5.1, we can prove that ¹ ql
n belongs to ¹ Q¤
n for each l < l0
n





n + (1 ¡ º0
n)r0
n, then the strategies ¹ ql
n for l < l0
n and r0
n if º0 < 1
are lexicographic best replies against ¤m. Likewise, if we express ¹ q
l1
n
n as ¹ º0
n~ p0
n + ¹ º1
np1
n + ¹ º2
nr2
n,
then the strategy r2
n if ¹ º2
n > 0 is a lexicographic best reply against ¤m. As in the proof of
Theorem 5.1 in subsection 5.8, we can now write down an LPS (q¤; ¹ q0("); ¹ q1(")) to show that
(q¤;(p0;p1);¼1) belongs to Q.















n(T). As in the proof of Lemma C.9, we can
assume that the strategies in Tm are best replies against the LPS (q¤
n;q0
n;q1
n). For all small ",




n), where r satis¯es the property
in the ¯rst line of the previous paragraph. Then for all small ", (";("r;"r);(p0(");p1);q("))AXIOMATIC EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION 43












n) + ®n(")(1 ¡ ¸0
n)
and qn(") = (1 ¡ ®n(") ¡ "r+1(1=¹1
n))q¤
n + ®n(")q0 + "r+1(1=¹1
n)q1
n.
For each (";¸), (E";¸;@E";¸) is a pseudomanifold. Indeed for (";¸) 6= (0;0) this follows
from the fact that this pair is homeomorphic to (F1;@F1), which is a pseudomanifold; for
(0;0), this follows from the fact that (E0;0;@E0;0) is homeomorphic to (Q;@Q). The inclusion
map (E";¸;@E";¸) induces an isomorphism of the d(P)-th cohomology groups. Thus ^ µ0;0 is
essential i® ^ µ";¸ is essential for some (and then all smaller) (";¸) 2 L. The projection map
^ µ0;0 is just the map ª. Hence Q¤ is stable i® ª is essential. ¤
In case S1
n is empty, the construction is modi¯ed as follows. We can omit the sets Cn(T)
and Bm(T) from the description of Q(T). In the last lemma above, the vector ¸ is now just
a number, one for player m. The simplex D constructed there is 2-dimensional and contains
a curve L of the form ¸ = "r. The rest of the proof is essentially the same.
This concludes the proof of the Theorem. ¤
Appendix D. Construction of The Map g
If the projection map ª is inessential then there exists a continuous map g : Q ! P that
has no point of coincidence with g. Therefore, there exists ® > 0 such that kª(x)¡g(x)k > ®
for all x 2 Q.
Suppose now that ª is essential. Since Q is a pseudo-manifold of the same dimension as
P, essentiality of ª in the sense we have de¯ned it in Section 5 is equivalent to essentiality
of ª in cohomology [23, Theorem, Section 4][11, Lemmas A.3, A.4], i.e. ª¤ : Hd(P;@P) !
Hd(Q;@Q) is nonzero. Moreover, letting d be the dimension of P and ª@Q the restriction of
ª to @Q, the degree of ª equals ±¤ ±ª¤
@Q(1), where 1 is the generator of Hd¡1(@Q) ¼ Z and
±¤ is the coboundary operator.
Fix some ¹ p in the interior of P and de¯ne ¶ : @P ! @P as follows: ¶(p) is the unique point
in the boundary of the form ¸p + (1 ¡ ¸)¹ p for ¸ < 0. ¶ is a homeomorphism without a ¯xed
point. Let g@Q : @Q ! @P be the function ¶±ª@Q, where ª@Q is the restriction of ª to @Q.
Then g@Q has no point of coincidence with ª@Q, i.e. for each x 2 @Q, g@Q(x) 6= ª(x). Also,
since ¶ is a homeomorphism, ±¤ ± g@Q is nonzero.
Construct a continuous map g@V (x¤) from @V (x¤) to @P such that ±¤ ± g¤
@Q[@V (x¤)(1) = 0
in Hd(Q n (V (x¤) n @V (x¤));@Q [ @V (x¤)). By the Hopf Extension Theorem [34, Corollary
8.1.18], the two maps g@Q and g@V (x¤) can be extended to a continuous map from Qn(V (x¤)n
@V (x¤)) to P; furthermore, by mapping points in V (x¤) to P in a way that extends g@V (X¤),
we obtain a map g : Q ! P such that all its points of coincidence with ª, of which there44 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
is at least one, are contained in V (x¤) n @V (x¤). There now exists ® > 0 such that for all
x = 2 V (x¤) n @V (x¤), kª(x) ¡ g(x)k > ®.
Appendix E. The Genericity Assumption
The conclusions of this paper necessarily hold only when, ¯xing the game tree, the payo®s
lie in a generic set. Here we outline the nature of the genericity that is invoked. First, we
require that the game has ¯nitely many equilibrium outcomes: in [5] we show that outside
a lower-dimensional set of payo®s every game has ¯nitely many outcomes. Second, the
constructions in Appendix C rely on certain polyhedra being in general position. Each of
these polyhedra, of which there are ¯nitely many, is a set of enabling strategies for a player
n against which, in a certain class of strategies for player m, a subclass is optimal. Since
these are de¯ned by linear equations and inequalities in the payo®s of player m, the set of
games where the arguments fail is a lower-dimensional set. Third, Lemma C.11 requires
a characterization of stable sets that in [11] we show holds for all games outside a lower-
dimensional set.
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